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STATEMENT OP PACTS 
Reeves contends that Steinfeldt gleaned the facts from 
selected portions of the record. The fact of the matter is that 
Reeves has failed to cite to the record. Pursuant to Rule 24(e), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party is required to refer to 
the pages of the organized record. Therefore, Reeves7 statement of 
the facts should be stricken and disregarded. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STEINFELDT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND OBJECTIONS TO 
REEVES' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
WERE PRE-JUDGMENT MOTIONS, AND DID NOT TOLL THE TIME TO 
FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
Reeves asserts that both Steinfeldt's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law were motions under Rule 59, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and tolls the time to file the Notice of Appeal 
under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Reeves 
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confuses the issue of what motions toll the time to appeal, and 
which do not. 
A. Steinfeldt/s Motion To Reconsider Was A Pre-
judgment Request For The Court To Rethink Its 
Memorandum Decision; And Does Not Fall Into A Rule 
Which Tolls The Time To Appeal, 
Generally, a trial court's jurisdiction is divested and 
transferred to the appellate court when a notice of appeal is 
filed. White v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 629 (Utah 1990). There are, 
however, exceptions to the transfer of jurisdiction; and some 
exceptions toll the time to file an appeal. 
1. Exceptions to the general rule divesting 
jurisdiction from the trial court. 
The exception most pertinent to this case is under Rule 4 (b) , 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states in part: 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the 
trial court . . . (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend 
. . . (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; 
or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal 
for all parties shall run from the entry of the order 
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such 
motion. 
The phrase "any other such motion" would entail any post judgment 
motion which is in essence a mislabelled motion falling under Rule 
4(a) , U* ah Rules of Appellate Procedure, (Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa 
& Son. 308 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Utah 1991)); and would act as its 
functional equivalent (See, Derrinqton v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 457 
2 
(Ut. App. 1991); Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 274 (Ut. App. 
1993)) . 
There are three (3) other exceptions from the principal that 
the Notice of Appeal has in divesting jurisdiction from the trial 
court. 
First, a trial court retains jurisdiction to consider a motion 
under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, while an appeal is 
pending to evaluate the motion more quickly and efficiently. White. 
795 P.2d at 649-50; Baker v. Western Surety Co.. 757 P.2d 878, 880 
(Ut. App. 1988). Second, under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, when one party receives a judgment in a multi-party 
action, the trial court retains jurisdiction over the remaining 
parties, and is not effected by the appeal. White. 795 P.2d at 650. 
Finally, under § 30-3-5(3), UTAH CODE ANN., a trial court retains 
jurisdiction to enforce or modify divorce proceedings to meet 
continuing and changing needs and problems, even if an appeal of 
the original order is pending. Peters v. Peters. 15 Ut.2d 413, 394 
P.2d 71 (Utah 1964). These exceptions do not apply to Steinfeldt's 
Motion for Reconsideration and cannot be characterized as falling 
under Rule 60(b), Rule 54(b) or under § 30-3-5(3), UTAH CODE ANN. 
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2. Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration is not 
a post-judgment motion, and does not fall 
under the 4(b) exception. 
Reeves attempts to characterize Steinfeldt's Motion for 
Reconsideration as a motion under Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; and misrepresents to the court that Steinfeldt brought 
the Motion for Reconsideration under Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. There is no basis for Reeves to believe the Motion was 
treated by the court, or intended to be, a Rule 59 Motion. In 
fact, Reeves attempts to interpret what the trial court thought by 
the court's December 8, 1994 Memorandum Decision. There is no 
statement in the Memorandum Decision to indicate that the court 
thought they were Rule 59 Motions. Steinfeldt's Motion was a pre-
judgment motion, and Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
only applies to post-judgment motions. Under Utah case law, 
Steinfeldt's Motion cannot be considered a Rule 59 Motion, as 
stated in Ron Shepard Insurance, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 
(Utah 1994): 
Rule 59, according to its plain language, applies only to 
motions for new trials or amendments of judgments. 
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of Judge Lewis's 
bench ruling was therefore not properly brought under 
that rule since no signed order or judgment was ever 
entered as a consequence of that ruling. There was no 
order or judgment signed by Judge Lewis to be reviewed 
under Rule 59. 
Id. at 653-54 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Reeves also 
states that Ron Shepard is a case under Rule 54, Utah Rules of 
4 
Civil Procedure, but Rule 54 is never mentioned in that case; 
actually, Ron Shepard deals with the difference between a Rule 59 
Motion and a Motion for Reconsideration of an oral decision prior 
to a final order or judgment. Id. In his Point I, Reeves also 
addresses the issue of whether Steinfeldt's Motion for 
Reconsideration was the functional equivalent of a Rule 59 Motion. 
Steinfeldt classified his Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to 
Ron Shepard, which recognizes a party may request a Judge to 
rethink a memorandum decision before entry of a final judgment (R. 
237-47, Addendum 2). The court in Ron Shepard held: 
It is settled law that a trial court is free to reassess 
its decision at any point prior to entry of a final order 
or judgment. In the present case, because no final order 
awarding defendants summary judgment was signed and 
entered, the matter was still pending when plaintiffs' 
motion for reconsideration was filed in Judge Lewis's 
court. She had every right to fully assess the matter 
and, if deemed appropriate, to receive additional 
evidence. 
Id. at 654 (citation omitted). See also. Bennion v. Hansen. 799 
P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985). Applying the Ron Shepard concept, 
Steinfeldt asked the trial court to rethink its Memorandum Decision 
of October 17, 1994 (The Ron Shepard case was decided 35 days prior 
to the Motion for Reconsideration, on September 20, 1994). As a 
result, Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration cannot be deemed 
the functional equivalent of a Rule 59 Motion; nor does it even 
meet the criteria under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate 
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Procedure, and Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as a post-
judgment motion—and cannot be considered a Rule 59 Motion. 
Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration is not a motion which 
falls under any of the exceptions to divesting jurisdiction from 
the trial court, specifically Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure; and does not toll the time to file a notice of appeal. 
Because Steinfeldt's Motion did not toll the appeal period, it was 
mandatory that Steinfeldt file his Notice of Appeal as he did. 
Steinfeldt's Notice, therefore, was timely filed under Rule 4, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and gives this Court proper 
jurisdiction to consider this case. 
B. Steinfeldt's Objections To Reeves' Proposed 
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, Was Not A 
Post-Judgment Objection To The Final Judgment. And 
Did Not Toll The Time For Steinfeldt To File A 
Notice Of Appeal. 
Reeves asserts that Steinfeldt's Objections to Reeves' 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, were an 
equivalent Rule 59 or Rule 52 motion under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. However, the document itself shows that the Objections 
were pre-judgment objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, albeit the Objections were chronologically 
filed after the Judgment (R. 269-74, Addendum 3). 
Reeves' proposed draft of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law sent to the Court were mailed to Steinfeldt on October 27, 
6 
1994 (R. 261, Addendum 4) ; and the Judgment, although signed by the 
Judge on November 4, 1994, was not filed until November 7, 1994 (R. 
266-68, Addendum 5). Steinfeldt sent his Objections to Reeves' 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on November 8, 
1994 (R. 269-74, Addendum 3). It wasn't until November 9, 1994 
that Notice of Judgment was sent from Reeves to Steinfeldt (R. 278-
79, Addendum 6) . This sequence of events created the chronology of 
the Objections being filed after the written Judgment; however, it 
is clear the Objections were pre-judgment because they questioned 
Reeves7 Proposed Findings of Fact rather than the trial court7s 
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. In 
fact, the Objections are titled "Defendant's Objection to 
Plaintiffs7 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," and 
refers to the Court 7s Memorandum Decision and not the final 
Judgment (R. 269-74, Addendum 3). Reeves wishes to alter the true 
nature of the Objections because of chronology, but the Objections 
are clearly pre-judgment. Reeves also wants to impose a 
requirement upon Steinfeldt, and other losing parties, to call the 
court each day to determine if the court has signed the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in order to avoid a "post-judgment 
motion." 
An illustrative case on this issue is Kinkella v. Baucrh, 660 
P.2d 233 (Utah 1983). In Kinkella, proposed Findings of Facts and 
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Conclusions of Law were signed by the trial court before the 
plaintiff objected to the proposed findings. JEd. at 235. The 
Supreme Court held that although the Objections were filed later, 
it was proper for the trial court to consider the Objections in 
their proper context and then allow the signed Judgment to stand. 
Id. In the case at bar, the trial court considered Steinfeldt's 
Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in its proper context (a pre-judgment motion) and allowed the 
signed Judgment to stand; and this point is seen in the Memorandum 
Decision of December 8, 1994, which states: 
Defendant filed its Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on November 8, 
1994. The Court having previously signed the Findings of 
Fact and Judgment in this matter on November 4, 1994, 
overrules the objection. 
(R. 298, Addendum 7). As a result, Steinfeldt's Objections to 
Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not 
a post-judgment motion in the context of Debrv v. Fidelity National 
Title Insurance Co. . 828 P.2d 520 (Ut. App. 1992). Debrv 
recognizes that what controls a motion (or objection) is its 
substance (Id. at 523); and substantively, Steinfeldt's Objections 
were pre-judgment objections. The period in which Steinfeldt could 
file his Notice of Appeal, therefore, was not tolled; and 
Steinfeldt's Notice of Appeal was timely under Rule 4, Utah Rules 
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of Appellate Procedure, and gives this Court proper jurisdiction to 
consider this case, 
C. Steinfeldt's Notice Of Appeal Is Valid. 
1. Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration and 
Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were effectively 
denied. 
Because the nature of both Steinfeldt's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were pre-judgment actions, the trial court's 
later written Judgment of November 4, 1994 and decision to allow 
the written Judgment to stand was determinative. The Motion for 
Reconsideration was directed at the earlier Memorandum Decision, 
and the Objections were directed at Reeves' Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law; and the written Judgment effectively 
denied the Motion, and overruled and the Objections. The 
Memorandum Decision of December 8, 1994 and written Order of 
January 3, 1995 regarding exclusively the Motion and Objections 
which followed the written Judgment of November 4, 1994 were 
cursory, and merely reiterated the actions of the Court at the time 
of the written Judgment of November 4, 1994. As a result, 
Steinfeldt's Notice of Appeal was timely because a final 
determination was made at the time of the written Judgment on 
November 4, 1994 was signed and filed with the trial court. 
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2. The trial court was divested of jurisdiction 
to make the written Order regarding 
Steinfeldt/s Motion for Reconsideration and 
Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Once a party files a notice of appeal, the trial court is 
divested of jurisdiction, and jurisdiction is transferred to the 
appellate court. White v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1990). As 
a result, as of December 27, 1994, the trial court was divested of 
jurisdiction by Steinfeldt's Notice of Appeal. The trial court, 
therefore, had no jurisdiction to enter the written Order denying 
Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration and overruling the 
Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
3. This Court should not hold that Steinfeldt's 
Motion for Reconsideration and Objections to 
Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are Rule 59 or 52 motions, 
as the record does not support such a holding. 
Such a characterization would work an extreme 
inequity on Steinfeldt. 
For the court to rule that a motion or objection is basically 
a Rule 59 or Rule 52 motion which tolls the time to file an appeal 
under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, creates an 
extreme difficulty for litigants. 
For example, a party may file a motion to reconsider intending 
a Rule 59 or 52 motion which will toll the time to file a notice of 
appeal, and the party does not file such notice; however, the 
10 
appellate court determines it is not a Rule 59 or Rule 52 motion 
and the party could not, therefore, make a timely notice of appeal 
because no tolling occurred. Or, a party files a motion to 
reconsider intending to ask a judge to rethink an oral decision, 
and the party then files a notice of appeal because the earlier 
motion would not toll the time for the notice; but then, the 
appellate court decides the motion is in fact a Rule 59 or Rule 52 
motion—which tolls the time to appeal—and the party is unaware of 
how the court treated the motion. Again, a party could not make a 
timely notice of appeal because the notice was filed too early. 
The uncertainty of such a ruling as to whether it is a Rule 59 or 
Rule 52 motion which is not designated by the movant under such 
rules makes it impossible for a party to proceed with knowledge 
that the rights to appeal have been preserved. It would be 
difficult for a party to proceed. Filing two (2) notices of appeal 
in all cases may be the only alternative. A party would be 
incurring expenses by filing multiple appeals and such a notion 
violates the scope of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to "secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules of Civil 
Procedure are to assist in the proceedings, not be a land mine for 
the litigant. 
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In this case, Steinfeldt intended the motion and objections to 
be pre-judgment and which would not toll the time to appeal; and 
they were never intended as Rule 59 or Rule 52 motions. His 
actions in filing the Notice of Appeal confirm such understanding. 
To determine the motions were something other than what Steinfeldt 
filed and designated as pre-judgment filings would work inequity 
and injustice to Steinfeldt, and all similarly situated parties. 
As a result, the Court should determine that Steinfeldt's Motion 
and Objections were not Rule 59 and Rule 52 motions, and were pre-
judgment motions not tolling the time file a notice of appeal. 
D. In The Alternative. Steinfeldt's Notice Of Appeal 
Should Be Treated As Deferred Or Suspended Until 
The January 3. 1995 Written Order. 
In the alternative, if the Court determines that Steinfeldt's 
Motion for Reconsideration and Objections to Reeves' Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are Rule 59 or Rule 52 
motions, then Steinfeldt's Notice of Appeal should be deferred or 
suspended until the January 3, 1995 written Order denying the 
Motion and overruling the Objections. Even if Steinfeldt's Motion 
and Objections are Rule 59 or Rule 52 motions, they were still pre-
judgment motions and Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
and Reeves' cited authority regarding Rule 4(b) and its effect do 
not apply. As distinguished, Steinfeldt's Notice of Appeal would 
simply be considered filed on January 3, 1995 at the same time the 
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Court made its formal written Order regarding Steinfeldt's Motion 
for Reconsideration and Objections. 
II. STEINFELDT DID NOT PARTIALLY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO FILE A 
MECHANIC'S LIEN NOTICE BECAUSE SUCH ALLEGED WAIVER WAS 
NOT CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 
Reeves argues that Steinfeldt has confused a waiver of a right 
to a mechanic's lien notice with a limited impairment to file a 
mechanic's lien at a particular time. However, it is Reeves who is 
trying to muddle the meaning of a waiver. 
A. Steinfeldt Allegedly Waived An Existing Right In 
Time To File A Mechanic's Lien Notice. 
At issue is whether Steinfeldt made a partial waiver by 
contract to his right in time to file a mechanic's lien notice by 
signing the August 9, 1993 Agreement. Reeves has used the terms 
waiver, partial waiver, limited waiver, and modification of a 
right; and Reeves can certainly choose to use the term limited 
impairment, and has also used the term modification. The bottom 
line is Steinfeldt challenges the trial court's decree that the 
written agreement, "superseded the defendant's general right to 
claim a lien and constituted a limited lien waiver. (R. 266-68, 
Addendum 5) (emphasis added). In other words, Steinfeldt could not 
contractually waive, partially waive, impair, or otherwise modify 
his rights to file a mechanic's lien until a particular time 
because the limited waiver was not expressed in the contract, and 
it was not clear or unambiguous. To put it another way, Steinfeldt 
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had a right to file a mechanic's lien notice. A contractual 
obligation to file a mechanic's lien notice at a later time would 
then waive an existing right of Steinfeldt to file the statutory 
lien (albeit the waiver would be partial, impaired, or otherwise a 
limited waiver to time only)• As a waiver of an existing right, 
therefore, there must be clear and unambiguous language in the 
contract for the waiver to be effective (See, Appellant's Brief, 
Point I.A.). 
B. Steinfeldt's Alleged Waiver Was Not Clear And 
Unambiguous, Or Even An Express Term Of The 
Parties' Agreement. 
The issue of whether the partial waiver was clear and 
unambiguous is basically ignored by Reeves, and tentatively argued 
in a footnote. Reeves refutes the issue by saying Steinfeldt7s 
cited cases dealt with total waivers, and in this case there is 
only a limited waiver (see discussion above). This argument 
ignores the standard of waiving an existing right (the right to 
file a mechanic's lien notice at a certain time) as established in 
Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991). 
In Reeves' Brief they state that "Steinfeldt contracted to fix 
the date on which he could file a lien—the closing date" 
(Appellees Brief at 10) . THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO MENTION, OR 
EXPRESSED TERMS, REGARDING A LIEN OR A LIMIT TO FILING A MECHANIC'S 
LIEN NOTICE IN THE AUGUST 9, 1993 AGREEMENT. Payment for work is 
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mentioned, payment at closing of the house is mentioned, fees and 
wages are mentioned, and a previous fee is mentioned; but, there is 
nothing expressed or implied which refers to Steinfeldt delaying 
the time in which he could file his mechanic's lien notice (R. 
217—Plaintiff's Exhibit "1," Addendum 8). There is no reference 
to a waiver of the right to file a lien which is the only security 
a contractor has in improving the owner's property. Reeves 
suggests no such express term is needed and there are no Utah cases 
on point regarding mechanic's lien notices and clear and 
unambiguous waivers. Reeves blatantly ignores Steinfeldt's cases 
on point: Neiderhauser Builders & Development Corp. v. Campbell, 
824 P.2d 1192 (Ut. App. 1992); Project Unlimited. Inc. v. Copper 
State Thrift & Loan Co.. 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990); and Boise 
Cascade Corp. v. Stevens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977); and suggests 
that Mine and Smelter Supply Co. v. General Insurance Co. of 
America, 471 P.2d 154 (Utah 1970) is not on point because of "an 
incredible latent ambiguity." However, Reeves misses the point 
that although a contract may appear clear and unambiguous, a latent 
defect will create the ambiguity—and a waiver will have no effect. 
In this case, the contract appears clear and unambiguous regarding 
payment; but there is no mention of a lien, or a limited lien 
waiver, and as a result there can be no clear or unambiguous 
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limited waiver regarding Steinfeldt's statutory rights to be 
secured for his work. 
Reeves' counsel goes as far as suggesting that Steinfeldt's 
position would basically require a copy of the mechanic's lien 
statutes to be included with any contract regarding a waiver. 
Steinfeldt's position does not suggest anything so drastic; 
however, a contract which waives or partially waives a right should 
at least mention which right is being waived. In this case, there 
is no such expressed term to suggest Steinfeldt is waiving or 
partially waiving any rights. 
III. THERE IS NO STATUTORY PRECLUSION TO STEINFELDT PILING A 
MECHANIC'S LIEN NOTICE EARLY. ALSO, SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLETION OP WORK DOES NOT MEAN CLOSING, AND STEINFELDT 
FILED HIS NOTICE AFTER SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION OF WORK. 
Reeves next suggests that not only does the contract limit the 
time in which Steinfeldt could file a mechanic's lien notice, but 
asserts that statutorily Steinfeldt could not file a mechanic's 
lien notice until Reeves' closing—because closing equals 
substantial completion, and a person cannot file the notice until 
after substantial completion. 
First, the mechanic's lien statutes do not say that a lien 
notice "may not be filed" until substantial completion of work, as 
Reeves has stated. In fact, the statute sets forth a limitation to 
file a lien notice—eighty (80) days after substantial completion, 
and beyond eighty (80) days there is no longer any right to file a 
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mechanic's lien. Contrary to Reeves' argument about the statute 
setting up a "window" in which to file a lien beginning at the time 
of substantial completion, and unsupported by Reeves. 
As far back as 1893 the Utah Supreme Court was dealing with 
the issue of mechanic's liens. The 1890 statute is cited in 
Morrison v. Carev-Lombard Co. , 9 Ut.2d 20, 33 P. 238 (1893), and 
many of the sections of the present code are very similar to the 
1890 code. The court interpreted Section 1, which is similar to §§ 
38-1-2 and 38-1-3, UTAH CODE ANN. (1993), as follows: 
From the day the contractor commences to work or furnish 
materials it is notice to all persons thereafter 
contracting with the owner that the property is burdened 
with a lien, and, if there were no further enactment, 
then there could be no question about the notice or the 
time of the attachment of the lien, nor of the persons 
entitled thereto. 
Id. at 25. 
The court continued in determining the creation of the 
mechanic's lien by stating: 
It is evident that the filing of the statement does not 
create the lien, for the language of the statute is, "Any 
party claiming a lien shall file," etc., but simply holds 
it or keeps it in force for the time of one year, as 
provided in Section 21 of the same act, so as to give the 
claimant an opportunity to enforce the same by process of 
law. 
Id. at 25. 
The Reeves want to contend that the contractor has a narrow 
"window" in which to file the lien, and that Steinfeldt did not 
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have the right to file the lien until after payment was due. The 
Morrison court dealt with a similar argument by counsel when he 
£ried to read the statute as a requirement of filing the Notice. 
Counsel for appellant contend that the word "may," in the 
expression "may file in the office," etc., should be 
construed "shall." If this theory were correct, then the 
effect would be that no lien of a sub-contractor would 
attach until the statement provided for in this section 
were filed. This might, and in many cases doubtless 
would, render nugatory the provisions in the first 
section of the act that the claimant shall have a lien 
"to the extent of the interest or claim of such owner 
thereto at the time of the commencement to do such work 
or to furnish such materials," . . . 
* * * 
The claimant may avail himself of it or not, as he 
chooses. If he does not, it will in no way interfere 
with his lien, which attaches when he commences to do 
work or furnish materials. 
Id. at 78-79. 
Additionally, the court spoke of the ability of the owner to 
impair the contractors rights: 
This section provides in express terms that all such 
liens shall attach at the time the performance of the 
contract commenced; and again it provides that valid 
encumbrances upon such land, made and recorded before 
that time, shall not be impaired, this clearly indicating 
that no act which the owner may thereafter do shall 
injuriously affect the lien of the claimant on the 
property. 
Id. at 29. 
The last important holding from the Morrison case is the lien 
is lost if not filed within the time frame. 
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After the work is completed or the materials are 
furnished the line may be lost by a failure to file the 
statement provided in section 10 within the time allowed 
in section 11, or by a failure to foreclose within the 
time as limited in this act; but unless there is such 
failure, or a payment of the claim, the property will be 
burdened with the lien, subject to prior encumbrances 
with which the property was burdened when the performance 
of the contract was commenced, or when the statement 
under section 12 was filed. 
Id. at 80. 
As can be seen, Reeves' arguments are totally without merit. 
A lien can be filed at any time after the contractor commences work 
on the project. 
Reeves' position also ignores the issue that courts will 
liberally construe the mechanic's lien statutes, and will construe 
these statutes in favor of lien claimants. Interiors Contracting v. 
Smith, Hollander, 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Ut. App. 1992). Also, Reeves 
ignores the issue that filing a mechanic's lien notice prior to 
substantial completion of work makes no effective difference than 
a similar filing during the eighty (80) days after substantial 
completion. The fact that Reeves cited Interiors is surprising. 
The issues in that case dealt with the fact that one of the parties 
filed a lien after the 100 days had run. Reeves also argues that 
if the 80-day window did not exist, that there would never be 
arguments over substantial completion. Interiors is the perfect 
example of the argument which arises from substantial completion. 
A contractor files the lien late and is then intending to extend 
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the substantial completion date. According to § 38-1-5, UTAH CODE 
ANN. (1993) , a mechanic's lien relates back to the commencement of 
work being done, and the priority is unaffected if the lien is 
filed one (1) day or eighty (80) days after substantial completion 
of work. The effect is the same if the lien notice is filed prior 
to substantial completion of work because the priority remains the 
same, and there is no prejudice to another because property 
subjected to a lien must deal with the lien in any of the above 
situations. The "window" which is created by the statute is the 
"window" from first day of work to 80 days after substantial 
completion; not as Reeves stated from substantial completion to 80 
days. 
Further, Reeves' position would place an undue burden on sub-
contractors to constantly be concerned with waiting for substantial 
completion of work to occur to finally trigger the supposed 
"window" in order to a file mechanic's line notice. In many 
instances, the project may be of substantial length. The first 
sub-contractors are not required by the statute, as Reeves would 
like to impose, to constantly monitor the progress in order to file 
during Reeves' "window." The requirement of Reeves works an undue 
burden and requirement upon contractors to factually determine 
substantial completion. If the trier of fact determines 
"substantial completion" had not occurred when contractor filed the 
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lien, the lien is invalid under Reeves' agreement. If on the other 
hand the trier of fact determines that substantial completion was 
earlier then what contractor determines, yet contractor held off on 
filing the lien because of the fear of filing too early, contractor 
has lost the statutory right. A series of traps and pitfalls for 
the contractor is not the intention of the statute. The intention 
is to protect the materialman who adds value to an owner's 
property. Reeves' position cannot be supported, and equity favors 
Steinfeldt on this issue. 
Second, Reeves gives no basis for the assumption that closing 
on a home is the same as substantial completion of work. In fact, 
Reeves down-plays Steinfeldt's hypothetical that a crafty document 
could delay closing beyond eighty (80) days from substantial 
completion of work because closing is allegedly the same as 
substantial completion. Reeves' own cited case is contrary to 
their argument, and shows Steinfeldt7s hypothetical is very 
possible and highly probable. In Daniels v. Desert Federal Savings 
and Loan, 771 P.2d 1100 (Ut. App. 1989), the plaintiff had 
contracted to perform work for a development in Park City, and 
completed construction by July, 1981. Id. at 1101. The defendant, 
who loaned money for the development, completed closing on the 
property by a Deed of Trust executed on February 22, 1982 and 
recorded on March 1, 1982. Id. ("Closing" is defined as "the final 
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steps of the transaction whereat the . . . mortgage is secured, 
deed is delivered or placed in escrow, etc." Black/s Law 
Dictionary. 231 (5th ed. 1979)). The plaintiff in Daniels was 
going to file a lien on the property after completing construction, 
but was induced not to file with a promise of payment. Daniels. 771 
P.2d at 1101. The court held that because the plaintiff waited 
over one hundred (100) days to file after completing the 
construction, the filing was untimely. Id. at 1102. In other 
words, substantial completion begins when construction ends (even 
if trivial or minor work still needs to be completed) , and not when 
closing is complete. Also, it is possible to induce a laborer to 
wait beyond the statutory period and prevent the filing of a lien 
notice, even though closing has not occurred. It would be 
inequitable, therefore, to allow parties to contract around the 
eighty (80) days—and prevent any possibility of filing a statutory 
mechanic's lien right without the party expressly waiving the 
right. 
Although Steinfeldt could have filed the lien earlier, 
Steinfeldt, filed his mechanic's lien notice after substantial 
completion of work. Steinfeldt was asked to stop work on November 
5, 1993, when final completion of construction was contemplated; 
and Steinfeldt worked until November 3, 1993 (R. 466, 503-05, 
Addendum 9). On November 5, 1993, Steinfeldt filed his mechanic's 
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lien notice after substantial completion occurred (R. 444, 469, 
488-89, Addendum 10, R. 217—Plaintiffs' Exhibit "2,", Addendum 
11) . The two (2) days in which Steinfeldt did not work only 
involved trivial jobs, and would hardly prevent an action by 
Steinfeldt for payment because of lack of claiming substantial 
performance. See, Interiors Contracting v. Smith, Hollander. 827 
P.2d 963, 966, and n. 4 (Ut. App. 1992). In fact, the Court 
awarded Steinfeldt the entire contract less some minimal offsets. 
Also, the $1,503.00 worth of work done by Reeves after November 3, 
1993 to complete the construction represents only .00237% of the 
$550,000.00 value of house constructed by Steinfeldt (R. 118, 
Addendum 12) . Such a disparity shows, as a matter of law, that 
substantial completion of the work occurred prior to Steinfeldt 
filing his mechanics lien notice. Carlisle v. Cox, 29 Ut.2d 136, 
506 P. 2d 60 (Utah 1973) (where .0011385% of uncompleted work 
compared to the total value of completed work, was trivial as a 
matter of law). 
Again, the use of Interiors by Reeves is surprising. In 
footnote 4, the case of Palombi v. D&C Builders, Inc., 22 Ut.2d 
297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969) is cited where the Court of Appeals 
paraphrases the case in holding "work consisting of obtaining a 
building permit and removing building materials from the work site 
is insufficient to extend the filing period." Id. at 327. As in 
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the case at bar, the Reeves' only work was attempting to obtain the 
final inspection. 
Reeves cannot, therefore, maintain the argument that 
substantial completion of work is the same as closing. Closing has 
nothing to do with the statute or ability of Steinfeldt to file the 
lien. Reeves' argument is invalid and has no application to the 
facts of the case in any event. 
IV. OVERSTATEMENT OP PEES CANNOT BE A WRONGFUL MECHANIC'S 
LIEN NOTICE. 
Reeves continues to assert that the mechanic's lien notice 
filed by Steinfeldt was wrongful and a breach of the agreement 
because it overstated the fees due to Steinfeldt. Reeves does not 
acknowledge that there is no requirement to list the amount of the 
lien on the notice. See, § 38-1-7, UTAH CODE ANN. (1993). Listing 
fees (whether over or understated) cannot constitute a wrongful 
filing if it is not required. Further, the purpose of the 
mechanic's lien notice is to inform interested parties of the 
lien's existence. In essence, Steinfeldt provided all of the 
required information to inform interested parties that he had a 
lien against the property. Such information could not prejudice 
Reeves. Reeves wants to combine the agreement and the mechanic's 
lien notice and say any deviation in the notice constitutes a 
wrongful action and a breach. The facts are that the mechanic's 
lien notice is a separate document serving a separate purpose; and 
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overstated fees on the notice has (if they be such) , at best, a de 
minimis effect. Reeves' position, therefore, is incorrect that 
overstated fees listed in the notice was wrongful conduct. 
V, THE AMENDED MECHANIC'S LIEN NOTICE WAS AN EFFECTIVE CURE. 
Reeves claims that Steinfeldt's amended mechanic's lien notice 
was not an effective cure because the notice still overstated the 
fees. However, as discussed above, the notice is a separate 
document serving a separate purpose. The amount of the lien is not 
even required to be listed on the notice. § 38-1-7, UTAH CODE ANN. 
(1993) . Therefore, the purported overstated fees would not prevent 
the amended notice to cure any alleged prior defect. 
Reeves also say there is no authority to allow an amended 
notice to cure a prior defect; on the other hand, no authority 
suggests Reeves' position is correct. It is this reason Steinfeldt 
questions the trial court's decision not to rule on this issue, and 
asks this court to rule the amended notice was an effective cure of 
any purported defect. The amended lien maybe constructed as a new 
timely filed lien. 
Next, Reeves suggest the amended notice would not cure the 
damages resulting from the earlier filing. But this position is 
unfounded, and Reeves ignores Steinfeldt's arguments. Reeves seem 
to change their position that Steinfeldt had absolutely no right to 
file his mechanic's lien notice. There can be no damages from an 
25 
earlier filing of the Notice because either way the lien was on the 
Reeves' property from the commencement of work, and Reeves would 
have ,fto deal" with the lien in any event (See. Supra Point III) . 
Whether Steinfeldt filed earlier on the first day work commenced, 
or on the last day that filing is possible, the lien still relates 
back to the first day work began. Reeves can show no unique 
"damages" because of any early filing if a later filing would have 
the exact same affect. Therefore, an amended lien filed within 
Reeves' desired "window" would effectively cure any alleged defect 
because the unique damages would not exist. 
Finally, Reeves stated the amended filing would do nothing 
because Reeves had not accepted Steinfeldt's work. This issue 
however, is a "red herring" since acceptance of work is not a 
condition of a valid lien and irrelevant. Morrison v. Carey-Lombard 
Co.f 9 Ut.2d 20, 33 P. 238 (1893). There is no indication Reeves 
did not accept Steinfeldt's work and only trivial items were 
performed by Reeves (R. 217—Plaintiffs' Exhibit "14," 400-411, 
416-18, Addendum 13). Steinfeldt was not asked to redo or repair 
any work performed; and Reeves was apparently satisfied with the 
work by proceeding to the closing. Also, Steinfeldt's work 
constituted substantial performance of his agreement; and what 
trivial work was left would not allow Reeves to not accept 
Steinfeldt's performance (See, Supra, Point III). A formal 
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acceptance by Reeves is irrelevant, since the amended notice is not 
affected by acceptance• 
VI. STEINPELDT IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
Reeves argues Steinfeldt has waived his right to interest 
because nothing more about interest was asked by Steinfeldt other 
than from the counterclaim. Reeves ignores the closing arguments 
by counsel, which states: 
[Steinfeldt] is entitled to his attorney fees in this 
matter as a result of 38-1-18 and the foreclosure of his 
lien. He is also entitled to the cost and interest from 
November 5. 1993, until the date of this judgment. 
(R. 529, Addendum 14) (emphasis added). Steinfeldt did not waive 
his right to prejudgment interest. The right to interest is 
created by statute when a debt is incurred. § 15-1-1, UTAH CODE ANN. 
(1993). 
Reeves also states the amount of damages were undetermined, 
and therefore, interest is improper. Reeves position is wrong for 
two (2) reasons. First, the amount due to Steinfeldt was clearly 
determined. The Findings of Fact state: 
The amounts due defendant under the terms of the 
agreement, but for his breach thereof are $10,000 plus 
$1.080 for unpaid supervisory fees. 
(R. 261-65, Addendum 4) (emphasis added). The amount due 
Steinfeldt was never disputed according to the contract, only the 
offset amounts claimed by Reeves. As an undisputed figure, 
Steinfeldt is due ten percent (10%) interest on the $10,000 and 
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$1,080 amounts from the day of closing, minus any offsets Reeves 
are due. 
Second, Reeves' cited case law deals with undetermined damages 
and interest. However, § 15-1-1, UTAH CODE ANN., deals with interest 
due on monies owed bv contract. This is not a case determining 
unknown medical expenses or unknown liability as being reasonable 
and necessary, but a case of contract payment and interest on 
unpaid amounts. In Corina v. Wilcox. 267 Utah Adv. Rpt. 40, 44 
(Utah 1995), it states: "without any clear factual information 
plaintiffs' damages could not be measured by xfacts and figures' or 
*calculated with mathematical accuracy'11 See, Canyon County Store 
v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). Steinfeldt is due his 
statutory ten percent (10%) interest on the amount Reeves was 
obligated to pay at the day of closing because it could be 
calculated with "facts and figures." 
VII. STEINFELDT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Reeves contends Steinfeldt cannot claim attorneys fees because 
Reeves was awarded offsets to Steinfeldt's outstanding debt, and 
therefore, cannot be a prevailing party. 
Reeves ignores their own contentions from the case, because 
they question whether Steinfeldt should be paid at all; for 
example: 
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The origin of the dispute centered on whether Steinfeldt 
had completed the job and so it was disputed whether the 
entire $10,000 fee enumerated in the contract was due, 
(Response Brief of Appellees. 17) (emphasis added). When the trial 
court made its decision, Steinfeldt was awarded what was due to him 
by the agreement—$10,000 and $1,080 for the service, minus offsets 
to Reeves ($1,503). (See also. Memorandum Decision of October 17, 
1994, which states: "Defendant is entitled to the benefit of the 
amended contract which he entered into with Plaintiffs . • . 
Defendant is entitled to the $10,000 under the contract, $300 
weekly contractor's fee, and $20 per hour for any extras, [minus 
offsets]." (R. 236, Addendum 15)). 
Reeves own cited case shows this award to Steinfeldt made 
Steinfeldt the prevailing party: 
Typically, determining the "prevailing party" for 
purposes of awarding fees and costs is quite simple 
. . . However, this simple analysis cannot be employed here 
because both plaintiff and defendant obtained some monetary 
relief against the other. Our review of the relevant case law 
convinces us that under the provision at issue, there can be 
only one prevailing party even though both plaintiff and 
defendant are awarded money damages on claims arising from the 
same transaction . . . We hold that in the present 
circumstances the party in whose favor the "net" judgment is 
entered must be considered the "prevailing party" and is 
entitled to an award of its fees. 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56 
(Ut. App. 1989) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). In 
applying this holding, the court continued: 
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that [defendant], in 
view of its net recovery of approximately $85,000.00, is 
the sole "prevailing party" as a matter of law. . . . 
[Defendant], while not enjoying total success on this 
appeal, is clearly the "prevailing party," and is 
entitled on remand to an award, of its attorney fees 
. . . The thrust of [plaintiff's] petition is that it must be 
held the prevailing party since it only claimed all along that 
it was entitled to some offset, in an amount to be proven, and 
ultimately proved it was entitled to an offset. . . . In this 
case, we remain convinced that application of the net judgment 
rule does not distort the relative success of the parties at 
trial . . . Viewed in any sensible way, [defendant] prevailed 
below and was entitled to the award of a reasonable attorney 
fee as the prevailing party. 
Id. at 556-59 (emphasis added) . The case at bar is similar to 
Neale. Reeves seeks to pay nothing, or at least payment minus 
offsets, and Steinfeldt seeks payment on a contract. Not counting 
the awarded attorneys fees, Reeves was awarded offsets of $1,503.00 
and Steinfeldt was awarded $9,577.00 ($10,000.00 plus $1,080.00 
minus $1,503.00). As a matter of law, Steinfeldt received the 
greater net judgment, and as the prevailing party is entitled to 
attorneys fees under § 38-1-18, UTAH CODE ANN. (1993). 
RESPONSE BRIEF OP CROSS-APPELLEE 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4 
The text of said statute is set forth in Addendum 1, attached 
hereto. 
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Steinf eldt does not disagree with the statement of the case as 
set forth in Reeves' Cross-Appeal brief, with the exception that 
the trial court basically ruled in favor of Steinfeldt to recover 
the amount due to Steinfeldt by contract, with offset amounts to 
Reeves. 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
Steinfeldt does not disagree with the statement of the facts 
as set forth in Reeves' Cross-Appeal brief, with the exception that 
evidence presented at trial regarding the costs of escrowing monies 
by Reeves was speculative and confusing; whereas, the delay in 
closing costs were more determinative. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Reeves filed an untimely notice of cross-appeal in 
violation of Rule 4(a) , and (d) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
A final Judgment was signed on November 4, 1994; and motions filed 
subsequent to the final Order did not toll the time period to file 
a notice of appeal under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
II. It was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to award 
Reeves $403.00 in escrow costs when the $403.00 figure was 
adequately ascertainable, and the $1,842.00 figure was a guess, and 
unascertainable by testimony or evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. REEVES FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY CROSS-APPEAL. 
Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, states that a 
cross-appeal must be filed: 
Within 14 days after the date on which the first notice 
of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this Rule, whichever 
period last expires. 
(emphasis added). Rule 4(a) states in part: 
The notice of appeal . . . shall be filed with the clerk 
of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry 
of the judgment or order appealed from. 
Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (emphasis added). The 
judgment from which Reeves takes this cross-appeal was signed 
November, 1994 (R. 266-68, Addendum 5); and Steinfeldt filed a 
Notice of Appeal on December 27, 1994 (R. 305-06, Addendum 16), 
pursuant to an extension of time granted by the trial court. 
Reeves filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on January 11, 1995: 68 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment appealed from; and 15 days 
after Steinfeldt filed the Notice of Appeal (R. 312-13, Addendum 
17). Moreover, application of a 3-day mailing period is 
inappropriate for an entry of a notice of appeal. State v. Palmer, 
777 P.2d 521, 522 (Ut. App. 1989). As a result, Reeves7 Notice of 
Cross-Appeal was untimely and must be dismissed. 
Reeves contends that the entry of the Judgment from which 
Reeves appeals was the written Order which denied Steinfeldt '& pre-
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judgment Motion for Reconsideration, and which overruled 
Steinfeldt's pre-judgment Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. However, the pre-judgment Motion 
and Objections did not toll the time period in which to file a 
notice of appeal under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The issue regarding Steinfeldt's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Objections to Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law is discussed and fully briefed in the body 
of Steinfeldt's Reply Brief to the Response Brief of Reeves, and 
incorporated and made a part of this argument herein by this 
reference. 
Because the time to appeal was not tolled by Steinfeldt's 
Motion for Reconsideration and Objections to Reeves' Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the entry of the Judgment 
from which Reeves wishes to appeal was on November 4, 1994. As a 
result, Reeves7 Notice of Cross-Appeal was untimely and must be 
dismissed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF $403.00 FOR DAMAGES AND COSTS 
OF ESCROWING WAS NOT ERRONEOUS BECAUSE SUCH DAMAGES WERE 
ASCERTAINABLE; WHEREAS, OTHER INDICATIONS OF COSTS WERE 
A GUESS AND CONFUSING. 
Reeves contends that evidence and testimony at trial regarding 
the interest costs of escrowing funds was "clearly11 $1,842.20 and 
the trial court7s award was clearly erroneous in refusing to use 
such figure in Reeves7 damages. However, examining the marshalled 
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evidence by Reeves shows the trial court's decision was not clearly 
erroneous. 
The $403.00 was interest costs by a delay in closing/ and such 
figures seems to be derived from an ascertainable computation. In 
the examination of Shawn Reeves (Reeves7 marshalled evidence 
paragraph 9), Mr. Reeves explained the $403.00 figure as follows: 
Q. And have you then attempted to calculate the interest 
differential between the amount that you had financed on 
your construction loan at the construction loan rate 
compared to the same amount at the long-term financing 
rate for those ten days that you were delayed in closing? 
A. Yes, we have. And the one was a base plus two, which 
would be six plus two was eight. And our long-term was 
four and an eighth. The eight days of interest came to 
approximately $403. 
(R. 396, Addendum 18). However, other interest costs for escrowing 
monies was at best a guess by Reeves. Arriving at the $1,842.00 
figure, Mr. Reeves states the following: 
Q. With respect to the cost of having to escrow the money at 
Security Title Company, have you attempted to calculate 
that based on Exhibit No. 20? 
A. Yes, we have. This was a little more confusing because 
it's a variable rate signature loan and every month the 
rate can change. And it goes anywhere from 12.9 to 13.9 
to 14.6. Just taking an average and estimating it, it 
came out to about $1,842.20, the finance charges we've 
paid. 
Q. Now that's just what you paid to Security Pacific; 
correct? 
A. Yes. We made $330 payments each month, the minimum. So 
some of that went to principal which made it even less, 
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and the rest went to principal too and the rest went for 
finance charges, 
(R. 396-97, Addendum 19) (emphasis added). Testimony of Mr. Reeves 
also shows Reeves received a $7,800.00 refund of the escrowed 
monies about March of 1994 (R. 423-24, Addendum 20); and shows that 
Reeves had already set aside the $10#000.00 fee payable to 
Steinfeldt (R. 424-25, Addendum 21). 
Further, Reeves' trial Exhibit No. 20, bank statements of a 
loan, are not complete (R. 217—Plaintiffs' Exhibit "20," Addendum 
22) . The statements do not show what percentage of each payment 
was for principal or interest, two (2) monthly statements are 
missing, and most of the statements occur after Reeves received the 
refunded monies from the escrow in March, 1994. 
As a result, the calculation of interest costs was confusing, 
unascertainable, and at best a guess. The Court did not know the 
exact rates charged. The Court did not know how much of the 
monthly payments were principal and finance charges versus interest 
payments. The Court did not know whether the refund of $7,800.00 
from the title company was factored into the calculation. There 
was also no indication that the $10,000.00 fee due to Steinfeldt, 
already set aside, was factored out of the total funds escrowed. 
Faced with such uncertainty, the trial court made no clear error in 
deciding to award the ascertainable amount as interest costs, and 
not a confusing guess. Reeves does not show that award was clearly 
35 
erroneous, and the trial court's award of $403.00 as interest costs 
should not be increased. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the preceding arguments and cited points and 
authorities, Thad B. Steinfeldt respectfully requests this Court to 
rule Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration and Objections to 
Reeves' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were pre-
judgment motions, and otherwise did not toll the time for 
Steinfeldt to file his Notice of Appeal; and to rule this Court has 
proper jurisdiction to hear Steinfeldt's appeal. 
Steinfeldt further reiterates his request for this Court to 
reverse the trial court's ruling that the parties' agreement 
superseded Steinfeldt's statutory right to file a mechanic's lien, 
and conclude Steinfeldt's mechanic's lien is valid and enforceable. 
Steinfeldt requests the Court to rule the parties' agreement was 
not a partial or limited waiver to Steinfeldt's right to file a 
mechanic's lien notice because there was no express, clear, and 
unambiguous term to partially waive such a right. 
Steinfeldt further requests this Court to rule that overstated 
fees listed on the mechanic's lien notice was not a breach of the 
parties' agreement. Also, Steinfeldt requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court's ruling that Steinfeldt's right to file a 
notice of lien was superseded by the August 9, 1994 agreement, and 
conclude Steinfeldt's Amended Notice of Lien effectively cured any 
alleged prior wrongful filing of the Notice of Lien. 
Steinfeldt also requests this Court to hold that Steinfeldt 
was entitled to interest on the amount Steinfeldt was due under the 
parties' contract pursuant to § 15-1-1, UTAH CODE ANN. 
Steinfeldt further requests this Court to reverse the trial 
court's award of attorneys fees to Reeves, and hold that Steinfeldt 
is entitled to statutory attorneys fees for this appeal and prior 
proceedings because Steinfeldt is the prevailing party in this 
action because he was awarded the net judgment of the contract 
price from the parties' agreement subject only to offset amounts. 
Steinfeldt further requests this Court to reverse the trial 
court's ruling that Steinfeldt filed the Notice of Lien "too soon" 
or "prematurely/1 allegedly in violation of the mechanic's lien 
statutes, and to rule that substantial completion of work does not 
mean closing. 
Steinfeldt also requests this Court to rule that Reeves' 
Notice of Cross-Appeal was filed untimely under Rule 4, Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure, because no motions filed by Steinfeldt 
tolled the time to file a notice of appeal. Further, Steinfeldt 
requests this Court not to award additional interest costs to 
Reeves because the trial court was not clearly erroneous by 
awarding only ascertainable damages. 
DATED AND SIGNED this l/l day of September, 1995. 
William M. Jeffs/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the original and seven (7) copies of REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT and RESPONSE BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE was mailed to the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals, and two (2) true and correct copies of the same was mailed to the below 
named party, this / ) day of September, 1995, addressed as follows: 
Mr. David D. Lambert 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
M^ ivft 
William M. Jeffs / 
Addenda 
Addendum 1 
ADDENDUM 1 
Sec. 15-1-1. Interest rates—Contracted rate—Legal rate 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of 
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose 
in action that is the subject of their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate 
of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance 
of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to 
affect any penalty or interest charge that by law applies to 
delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made 
before May 14, 1981. 
UTAH CODE ANN., § 15-1-1 
Sec. 38-1-5. Priority—Over other encumbrances 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take 
effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish 
materials on the ground for the structure or improvement, and shall 
have priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which 
may have attached subsequently to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first 
material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or 
other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which 
was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement 
was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the 
ground. 
UTAH CODE ANN. , § 38-1-5 
Sec. 38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on 
owner of property 
(1) Each contractor or other person who claims the benefit of 
this chapter within 80 days after substantial completion of the 
project or improvement shall file for record with the county 
recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the 
property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth the 
following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the 
name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he 
furnished the equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was 
performed or the first and last equipment or material was 
furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for 
identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent 
and an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, 
Chapter 3. No acknowledgment or certificate is required for any 
notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien 
claimant shall deliver or mail by certified mail to either the 
reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the 
notice of lien. If the record owner's current address is not 
readily available, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the 
last-known address of the record owner, using the names and 
addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment 
rolls of the county where the affected property is located. 
Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner 
or record owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs 
and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or record owner in an 
action to enforce the lien. 
UTAH CODE ANN., § 38-1-7 
Sec. 38-1-18. Attorneys' fees 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as 
costs in the action. 
UTAH CODE ANN., § 38-1-18 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing-a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
P , : l I\ fanting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses 
I he findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
tact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b) The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56 and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
m actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
tor divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived bv the 
parties to an issue of fact: y 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
Rule 59, New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Addendum 2 
WILLIAM M. JEFFS, #5726 
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Counter Claimant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH I ' "" 
SHAWN F. REEVES and | MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
JULIE N REEVES, AUTHORITBES IN SUPPORT OF 
| DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
Plaintiffs, RECONSIDERATION 
I 
I 
I'HAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, | 
Defendant, J 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
< ,. it L n i u n t , 
SHAWN F. REEVES and 
JULIE N. REEVES, 
S; OCT 23 .ftf 2:0 J 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Thad B. Steinfeldt, by and through counsel, 
William M. Jeffs, and hereby supports this Memorandum in Support of this Motion for 
Reconsideration to reconsider the court's Memorandum Decision dated October 17, 1994. 
A Motion for Reconsideration may be granted as long as there is no signed Order 
in the file of the Court. In the October 17, 1994 Memorandum Decision, this Court states as 
follows, MThis memorandum decision has no affect until such Order is signed by the Court.M 
The Utah Supreme Court has just recently ruled on Motions for Reconsideration. In the case 
of Ron Shepherd Insurance v. Sheilds. 248 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (Utah 1994), they stated as 
follows: 
It is settled law that a trial court is free to reassess its decision at 
any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment. Bennion v. Hansen. 
699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985). In the present case, because no final 
order awarding defendant summary judgment was signed and entered, the 
matter was still pending when plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was 
filed in Judge Lewis's court. She had every right to fully reassess the 
matter and, if deemed appropriate, to receive additional evidence. When 
Judge Lewis recused herself and the matter was assigned to Judge Rokich, 
he likewise had every right to fully review the matter. 
Id. at 4. 
This court has the ability to re-examine the arguments and evidence submitted by 
the parties at trial. Plaintiffs' counsel submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and a Trial 
Memorandum. Defendant did not submit Proposed Findings based upon representation from 
Plaintiffs' counsel that he would not be submitting proposed findings. Defendant is submitting 
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a follow-up to the Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
POINT I 
THE UTAH CODE DOES NOT PUT A REQUIREMENT 
THAT THE MONEY MUST BE DUE PRIOR TO FILING A LIEN. 
The court implicit in its Memorandum Decision stated, "However, Defendant 
contract, Defendant was to be paid at the time of the closing, at the time Defendant filed the lien 
i» MII l 11 ilei I 11 MI Hit Defendant 
the August 9 agreement, but, states that the Defendant was not entitled to the money until the 
closing date. The Court held that because the Defendant was not entitled to the money until the 
Defendant w as pi ech ided from filing tl le liei i Nowhere ii i the tria 1 :)i ii i a rgi 11 i ici its did 
Plaintiffs' counsel show any case law or statute that held that a person could not file their lien 
is entitled of a lien and what may be attached: 
Contractors, sub-contractors and all persons performing any services or 
furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement 
to any premises in any manner and licensed architects and engineers and 
artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, 
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a 
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lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered 
service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment 
for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the 
instance of the owner of any other person acting by his authority as agent, 
contractor, or otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the 
owner may have in the property as stated in that Section. 
In the above section it states that they shall have a lien upon the property. In this matter it does 
not state that the lien is only valid after time for payment is passed, it states that he has a lien 
when the services are rendered. The statute grants a lien to the Defendant, the recordation of 
the lien is the way in which an individual perfects the lien. As the services are performed, the 
lien accrues, in order for a party to take full advantage of the Mechanics' Lien Statute, they 
must perfect the lien and follow the statutory requirements. 
In the instant case, Mr. Steinfeldt performed the labor as a general contractor and 
the dispute arose as to the amount of payment for his services. His lien attached as the services 
were performed. Mr. Steinfeldt is therefore entitled to a lien upon the property as the services 
are performed and the time is progressing. 
By looking at §38-1-7 UTAH CODE ANN. (1993), we determine the mode of perfection 
of that lien: 
(1) Each contractor or other person who claims the benefit of this 
chapter within 80 days after substantial completion of the project or 
improvement shall file for record with the county recorder of the county 
in which the property,or some part of the property, is situated, a written 
notice to hold and claim a lien. 
4 
In this Section, it does not require that he file his lien after he has performed his last services 
or labor only that he file it within the eighty days after substantial performance. The eighty days 
statute of limitations i 
will be no more liens to be filed. As demonstrated hereafter, an individual is authorized to file 
a dispute \ itllll: it the o w nei 
In the construction business, it is a common procedure as you are building a residential 
home or on a commercial construction site, that as each sub-contractor receives draws 
throughout the construction process they file lien waivers for each individual payment that they 
receive. There are two reasons for the general having lien waivers signed at this time. First, 
sc 1:1 lat 1:1 le si it conti a :toi • :a nn :)!: file a I  iei :t foi v « 
because the sub-contractor has the right to file the lien at fha runt u cause the ., t 
i uiili.K Imi in WJIMH' (li ill In n .liiiiill iriniM llir imj lul  I hli llul Iicii in I lie lulim1 loi the past work. 
Under the above statutes and reasoning, Defendant was entitled to file his lien on 
November 5, 1993 and it was not a wrongfully filed lien. As a side note, it should be noted that 
the original lien of November 5, was amende*' - • December ?,\ 199 ^ witl i a i I an iei ided li *i i 
If the November lien was an invalid lien because it was filed early, the December 22, 1993 lien 
iV t lRVtn i lllil l-Hl'dk'Hi tKVatISi ll " ' | l " ,l • I In * h i n t 1 l i l i f U ' i l i l h ' 1 i l l t ' n III! l i t In v w n I t X O h l u l 
AnI acknowledgement was required > )e signed by Mr. Steinfeldt for the title company to 
release a portion of the funds out he escrowed monies and return the money back to the 
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Plaintiffs'. In the acknowledgment Mr. Steinfeldt stated that the amended lien is for a reduction 
of the claimed lien amount. 
The Defendant respectfully requests the court to reconsider its ruling that the lien 
filed by Defendant on November 5, 1993, was wrongfully filed and rule that Defendant had the 
right to file said lien to protect Defendant's claim for payment. 
POINT H 
THE AUGUST 9, 1993 AGREEMENT IS NOT 
A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT'S LIEN RIGHTS. 
Implicit in the Court's Ruling is the fact that by signing the August 9 agreement, 
Defendant has waived any of his lien rights pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, of the UTAH CODE 
ANN. and Defendant is not entitled to file a lien until after the closing date. As stated by 
Defendant's counsel at the trial, in order to waive those lien rights an individual must explicitly 
waive those lien rights. In the case at bar, the only statement made was that the Defendant 
would be paid at the closing. The Utah courts have not ruled on this issue but, as was pointed 
out to the Court, both the Colorado Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeal of Oregon have 
ruled that a party must expressly waive the right to file a lien. 
In Ragsdale Bros. Roofing v. United Bank. 744 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1987) it 
states as follows: 
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If the terms of the contract and evidence of the alleged waiver of 
a mechanics lien are ambiguous, doubt must be resolved against the 
waiver. Bishop v. Moore. 137 Colorado 263, 323 P.2d 897 (1958). In 
the absence of language clearly indicating an intention to waive a lien, it 
will not be supposed that the laborer or materialman intended to relinquish 
absolutely his statutory right to claim one beyond the amount of 
consideration received. Bishop v. Moore, supra. The trial courts ruling 
that Corneau-Finley did not waive its right of lien on the part of its claim 
which remained unpaid is supported by competent evidence. Thus, we 
conclude that the trial court did not commit error in fact or law. 
M. at 754-55. 
Oregon Coi u ts support (In. I "olnnadt ("tmi is, In Harris v. Dyer 
223, 623 P.2d 662 (1980), it states: 
We conclude, therefore, that in the absence or an express waiver 
by the contractor of his right to file a construction lien, an agreement to 
arbitrate disputes does not deprive him of the right to file a lien. Having 
the right to file a claim of lien for amounts claimed to be due would be 
a hollow gesture unless the contractor also has the right to pursue that 
claim to fruition. If he is not entitled to file a suit to foreclose the lien, 
the lien would expire within six months after the filing of the lien claim, 
ORS 87.055, and would be for naught. If, however, the contractor files 
a suit to foreclose the lien within the statutory period, the lien continues 
and, if it ripens into a decree foreclosing it, the lien has priority as of the 
date it was filed. ORS 87.025. The priority of the contractor's claim over 
other liens against the property might well, in many cases, be the 
difference between the contractor's being paid, or not being paid, the full 
amount of his claim, (footnotes omitted). 
If, as the Plaintiffs' argue, Defendant is not entitled to file a lien and that Plaintiff 
has "waived" his lien by signing the August 9 agreement, these cases hold that the waiver must 
-* *
 KJ
 ' • * ^ is silent a s to 
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the right to file a lien. Therefore, the Court is to construe against the waiver and hold that the 
lien is a validly filed lien. 
POINT m 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
IN THE COLLECTION OF DEFENDANT'S LIEN. 
The court awarded Plaintiffs' their attorney's fees in the matter for bringing the action 
on the basis that the lien was filed wrongfully, for an excessive amount despite the fact that the 
Defendant corrected the filing on December 22, 1993. The court also ruled that it was filed too 
soon. The statute does, however, not state that Defendant must wait until the time for payment 
is passed before filing the lien. The Court ruled the Defendant to be entitled to the amount 
under the contract entered into on August 9, 1993. The Court does not find that the default 
violated the code, nor does the court cite a basis for awarding the Plaintiffs' their attorney's 
fees. This is unjust to the Defendant on the basis that Defendant was required to defend and 
also prosecute their own counterclaim to foreclose the lien and was, in fact, entitled to recovery 
under the August 9 agreement and should be entitled to his attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests this court to review the Ruling of October 17, 1994 and 
reconsider its ruling that the lien was wrongfully filed and filed too soon and instead rule that 
the lien, although it was in excess, was not wrongfully filed and was corrected by the December 
8 
22, 1993 Amended Lien that corrected the defect and in fact, Defendant is entitled to foreclosure 
of their lien and attorney's fees in 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this - > day of October, 1994. 
./» 
I /7i 
William M. Jeffs {/ 
,'^tt 4~\ i'-V 
WILLIAM M. JEFFS, #5726 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Counter Claimant 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 373-8848 
Facsimile: 373-8878 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and | MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
JULIE N. REEVES, 
i i 
Plaintiffs, 
I 
vs. 
I 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, j 
Defendant, { 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SHAWN F. REEVES and 
JULIE N. REEVES, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Thad B. Steinfeldt, dba Steinfeldt Construction, 
by and through counsel, William M. Jeffs and hereby respectfully submits to the court a Motion 
for Reconsideration to reconsider the Court's Octobei I" \ l^ 'M , Memorandum Decision Sa id 
Motion is based on the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of this 
Motion for Reconsidi 
DATED AND SIGNED this >w day of October, 1994. 
>M.^ '?< 
William M. Jeffs 
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Addendum 3 
WILLIAM M. JEFFS, #S7?rt 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 373-8848 
Facsimile: 373-8878 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and 
JULIE N. REEVES, " CERTHTCATE OF MAILING 
I 
Plaintiffs, 
I 
vs. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, | 
Defendant, | 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SHAWN F. REEVES and 
JULIE N. REEVES, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Civil No. 940400014 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
I hereby certify that the original of Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was sent to the Clerk of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, and a true and correct copy of the same was sent to the below named party, with postage 
(VlAfay of pre-paid thereon, this l  November, 1994, addressed as follows: 
Mr. David D. Lambert, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
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WILLIAM M. JEFFS, #5726 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 373-8848 
Facsimile: 373-8878 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and | 
JULIE N. REEVES, 
vs 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, j 
Defendant, J 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba | 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Counter Claimant, 
vs. 
SHAWN F. REEVES and 
JTTT TEN. REEVES, | 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS 
TO PLAINTTFFS' PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I'.Oly 
4> 1.9: s? 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Civil No. 940400014 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Thad B. Steinfeldt, by and through counsel William 
M. Jeffs, and hereby objects to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
as follows: 
POINT I 
General Objection 
The Court should not sign the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law until the 
Court has ruled on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, which was filed with this Court on 
October 25, 1994. Plaintiff has file a response to the Motion for Reconsideration, but, 
Defendant has not file a reply or a Request for Ruling. 
POINT H 
Specific Objections 
1. Defendant hereby objects to Finding of Fact No. 5, the Court's 
Memorandum Decision makes no mention of Defendant's failure to complete the construction. 
2. Defendant hereby objects to Finding of Fact No. 8 on the basis that it is 
not a finding of fact, but is a conclusion of law. 
3. Defendant hereby objects to Finding of Fact No. 11 on the basis that it 
states that Plaintiffs are the successful party in the lien action. The Court makes no mention in 
the Memorandum Decision dated October 17, 1994, who is the successful party in this matter. 
4. Defendant hereby objects to Finding No. 12 on the basis that the Court 
only stated in their Memorandum Decision that the Defendant is entitled $10,000, $300 per week 
2 
and $20 per hour for any extras. The Court's Memorandum Decision does not make a 
determination for the number of weeks for which Defendant is entitled to receive the $300 per 
week. The Decision does not make a determination of the number of hours Defendant for which 
reimbursement is entitled. It appears that Plaintiffs have deducted a portion of the weekly 
supervisory fee and in the Memorandum Decision it does not state, although the Court listed all 
of the other deductions and offsets Plaintiffs were entitled to, or make mention of a 
determination for the supervisory fee. 
5. Defendant hereby objects to the Conclusion of Law No. 4 on the basis that 
it states that there is a limited lien waiver. There was no language in the August 9, 1993, 
agreement stating that he was waiving his lien right and no mention in the Memorandum 
Decision of a lien waiver, therefore the statement that it was limited lien waiver should be 
removed from the Conclusion of Law. 
Defendant additionally objects to Conclusion of Law No. 4 on the basis that the 
determination that the filing of a lien prior to the closing was a breach of the contract and 
wrongful. The Memorandum Decision does not state that the lien was. wrongful, only that it was 
filed early by Defendant. Defendant additionally objects to the Court's Conclusion that a 
contractor is not entitled to file a lien until after a time of payment has been passed. 
6. Defendant objects to Conclusion of Law No. 5 on the basis that the Court 
concluding that it was a breach of the agreement by failing to participate in the inspection when, 
in fact, testimony showed that he had substantially completed the construction. 
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7. Defendant objects to Conclusion of Law No. 6 on the basis that the 
written agreement by demanding an excess is not a breach of the agreement until the Court ruled 
that the August 9, 1993 agreement converted the contract from a percentage construction 
contract to a flat fee contract Defendant, did not file a wrongful lien. 
8. Defendant objects to Conclusion of Law No. 7 on the basis that the Court 
did not state that the Defendant was not due the money until closing of the long-term financing. 
9. Defendant objects to Conclusion of Law No. 10 on the basis that Plaintiffs' 
are not the successful party in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this b day of November, 1994. 
William M. Jeffs T 
s I 
l) 
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Visn 
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Wuty 
D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our File No. 22,330 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. 
REEVES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 940400014 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
The above-captioned matter came on for trial on the 3rd day of October, 1994, the Hon. 
Ray M. Harding presiding. Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel, D. David 
Lambert for Howard, Lewis & Petersen. Defendant was present and represented by William 
Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs. The Court received the evidence, testimony and arguments of the parties, 
and, being fully advised, now makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
L Jurisdiction and venue are properly before this Court. 
2. Plaintiffs are the joint owners of certain real property located at 53 West 650 
North, Lindon, Utah County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as follows: Lot 
8, Plat A, Green Valley Estates. 
3. Defendant acted as the general contractor to build a home for the plaintiffs on 
the subject property under an agreement between the parties; however, after construction had 
proceeded through approximately the framing stage, the parties discussed and reached a revised 
agreement dated August 9, 1993 as to further compensation to the defendant for his work as 
general contractor for the construction of the home. That agreement was reduced to writing and 
states in its entirety as follows: 
At close of house, Thad Steinfeldt will be paid $10,000 which 
will be payment in full for all labor and services concerning 
Shawn & Julie Reeves' house at 53 W. 650 N. Lindon, Utah. 
This is in addition to regular $300\week supervision fees and 
hourly wages of $20 approved in advance for any necessary 
changes. $14,000 contractor fee in loan is null and void. 
S/ T. B. Steinfeldt 
S/ S. F. Reeves 
4. The above agreement governs the method and-time of compensation to 
Defendant for his work as general contractor. 
5. The defendant failed to complete the work he was to perform as general 
contractor and plaintiffs had to procure substitute performance to complete the construction. 
6. Plaintiffs made all payments to defendant required of them pursuant to their 
agreement with the defendant through the date of the last draw in October, 1993. 
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7. On November 5, 1993, defendant filed his original lien against plaintiffs 
property claiming the sum of $17,929, The defendant amended his lien on or about the 22nd 
day of December, 1993, and claimed a lien amount of $12,764.19. 
8. Defendant should be required to immediately remove the lien against the 
plaintiffs' property. 
9. Plaintiffs personally or through arrangements with other contractors, completed 
the final construction work and inspections which required 48 hours of their time which is valued 
at $20.00 per hour. Plaintiffs also had to pay Kim Anderson $140.00 for work to finish 
construction. 
10. Plaintiffs had to escrow one and one-half of the lien amounts in order to close 
the long-term financing. 
11. Plaintiffs are the successful parties in this lien action and have incurred legal 
fees of $6,242.50 which were reasonable and necessary. 
12. The amounts due defendant under the terms of the agreement, but for his breach 
thereof are $10,000 plus $1,080 for unpaid supervisory fees. 
13. Plaintiffs are entitled to deduct the following amounts from the contract amounts 
due to the defendant: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
3 
Cost of finishing construction $ 1,100.00 
Cost of escrowing monies for lien $ 403.00 
Attorneys fees $ 6,242.50 
TOTAL $ 7,745.50 
14. The total amount due defendant, after the above set offs is $3,334.50. 
The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The written agreement set forth in paragraph of the findings above voided any 
prior agreements between the parties. 
2. The language of the parties' written agreement is clear and unambiguous; 
3. The language of the written agreement which specifies the method of payment 
to the defendant should be enforced as written. 
4. The specific terms of the written agreement concerning the time of payment 
superseded the defendant's general right to claim a lien and constituted a limited lien waiver. 
For these reasons, defendant's filing of the lien prior to the closing of the long-term financing 
was a breach of contract and wrongful. 
5. The defendant breached his agreement to act as general contractor by failing 
to finalize construction and failing to participate in the final inspection process. 
6. Defendant breached the written agreement between the parties by demanding, 
in the bill submitted and in the original lien filed, payments substantially in excess of the 
compensation specified in the agreement. 
7. Plaintiffs made all payments to defendant required of them pursuant to their 
agreement with the defendant as of the date of the last draw in October, 1993, and further 
monies due defendant were not to be paid until closing of the long-term financing. 
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8. Defendant must immediately remove the lien from plaintiffs' property. 
9. Plaintiffs are the successful party in this action and are entitled to fees pursuant 
to U.C.A. § 38-1-18. 
10. Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs as provided by Rule 54(d), U. R. Civ. 
P. 
DATED this < / day of November, 1994. 
BY^THE COURT 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this <P-( day of October, 1994. 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
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F- ; - i 
D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Our FUe No. 22,330 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. 
REEVES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 940400014 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
The above-captioned matter came on for trial on the 3rd day of October, 1994, the Hon. 
Ray M. Harding presiding. Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel, D. David 
Lambert for Howard, Lewis & Petersen. Defendant was present and represented by William 
Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs. The Court received the evidence, testimony and arguments of the parties, 
and, having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and 
enters a judgment in the case. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The written agreement set forth in paragraph 3 of the Court's findings voided 
any prior agreements between the parties. 
2. The language of the parties' written agreement is clear and unambiguous; 
3. The language of the written agreement which specifies the method of payment 
to the defendant shall be enforced as written. 
4. The specific terms of the written agreement concerning the time of payment 
superseded the defendant's general right to claim a lien and constituted a limited lien waiver. 
For these reasons, defendant's filing of the lien prior to the closing of the long-term financing 
was a breach of contract and wrongful. 
5. The defendant breached his agreement to act as general contractor by failing 
to finalize construction and failing to participate in the final inspection process. 
6. Defendant breached the written agreement between the parties by demanding, 
in the bill submitted and in the original lien filed, payments substantially in excess of the 
compensation specified in the agreement. 
7. Plaintiffs made all payments to defendant required of them pursuant to their 
agreement with the defendant as of the date of the last draw in October, 1993, and further 
monies due defendant were not to be paid until closing of the long-term financing. 
8. Defendant must immediately remove the lien from plaintiffs' property. 
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9. Plaintiffs are the successful party in this action and are entitled to fees pursuant 
to U.C.A. § 38-1-18. 
10. Plaintiffs are entitled to set offs of $7,714.25 against amounts owed to 
defendant of 11,080, leaving a balance due to defendant of 3,365.75. 
11. Plaintiffs are awarded their costs in the sum of $546.60. 
DATED this */_ day of November.,..1994. 
/ ' / 
V 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this **• ' day of October, 1994. 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
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Addendum 6 
D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
J :\ddl\reevesnt.jud 
Our File No. 22,330 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES nad JULIE N. 
REEVES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT 
Case No. 940400014 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
TO: THAD B. STEINFELDT dba STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, Defendant. 
You are hereby given notice that a judgment against you was entered in this action on 
the 4th day of November, 1994. A copy of said judgment is attached. 
DATED this * day of November, 1994. 
D. D A V I B ^ A M B L K I , / t o r : 
HOWARD, LEWIS A f^fETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been mailed to the 
following defendant, this zt day of November, 1994: 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
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Addendum 7 
FILED 
Fourth Jydir-ial District Court of 
Utah Coijniv. Stale of Utah. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COXJ^SS^' 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
™ " " ~ Deputy 
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. 
REEVES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba STEINFELDT 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 940400014 
DATE: December 8, 1994 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for consideration of Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration, Defendant's Request for Oral Arguments and Defendant's Objections to 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court having considered 
memorandum both in support and in opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration hereby 
denies the motion. The Court further finds as follows: 
Defendant filed its Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on November 8, 1994. The Court having previously signed the Findings of Fact and 
Judgment in this matter on November 4, 1994, overrules the objection. Further, the Court 
finds that the Request for Oral Arguments was not timely filed and therefore denies the 
request. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision consistent 
with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form 
prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effectjuntil 
such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 8th day of December, 1994. 
cc: D. David Lambert, Esq. 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
A 
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Addendum 9 
14 J 
witness. 
MR. JEFFS: At this time, your Honor, we 
would like to call Thad Steinfeldt. 
THE COURT: If you'd come forward, sir, and 
take the witness chair. I remind you you are still 
under oath. 
THAD BRENT STEINFELDT 
recalled as a witness herein, having previously 
been sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEFFS: 
Q You've already stated your name for the 
record, but could you tell us how long you've been in 
the construction business? 
A My grand dad was a building contractor, so my 
whole life, I guess. 
Q Just about as long as you can remember? 
A Pretty much. 
Q From August 9th to November 3rd did you 
continue to act as the general contractor for the 
Reeves? 
A Yes. 
Q And what work did you perform during that 
time? 
A Scheduled the subcontractors, coordinated 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
M r+r* 
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fees? 
A Yes. 
MR. JEFFS: I have no further questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. You may 
cross-examine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LAMBERT: 
Q Mr. Steinfeldt, I want to refer your 
attention to Exhibit 5. I'm going to show you now 
what we've previously marked and received as Exhibit 
No. 5. And in Exhibit 5 under the labor for the your 
alleged extra charges there isn't one thing in there 
about the dark room, is there? 
A No. 
Q And other than that explanation on Exhibit 
No. 5, you've never provided the Reeves with any other 
explanation of the work that you did for these 53 
hours of extras that you've claimed; isn't that 
correct? 
A Other than this? 
Q Correct. 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q Now, with respect to the way that you were 
getting paid for supervision, you were getting paid 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
A r\ 
179 
Q But in point of fact, you told us in your 
deposition testimony that you left the job because 
they wouldn't pay the supervisory fee past that week; 
isn't that correct? 
A The reason that I didn't come back after. 
Q No. I'm asking you is it correct that you 
told us that? 
A I can't remember what I said. 
Q Well, let me show it to you. 
MR. LAMBERT: Do you have the original 
deposition? 
MR. JEFFS: What page are you on. 
MR. LAMBERT: Fifty-two. 
Your Honor, I've got the original. I'm 
asking that it be published. 
THE COURT: All right. It may be opened and 
given to the witness. 
Q (BY MR. LAMBERT) Mr. Steinfeldt, I'm going 
to show you your deposition that was taken on the 9th 
day of March, 1994, and ask you to turn to page 52. 
Let's see if I've got the right page here. Well, 
that's not the right page. 
There it is. This is the question I put to 
you at that time. "You're telling us here today that 
the one and only reason you left the job was because 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
erno 
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they weren't going to continue paying your supervisory 
fee beyond the week ending November 6th?" 
A Now I'm lost. Where are you at? 
Q Down at the bottom, the last question on --
it's actually on page 53. I'm sorry. No, wait a 
minute. I'm all goofed up. Let's start over again. 
It's on page 53 in the middle, and I'm going 
to begin at line 1. And it goes down through the 
middle there. 
The question was, "Friday was November the 
5th. Saturday, November 6th, would be the last day of 
that week. They told you they were'nt going to pay 
your supervisory fees beyond that week; correct?" 
Your answer was, "I can't remember the facts 
other than they said they didn't want me there after 
that date." 
Question, "After November 5th?" 
Answer, "Yes." 
Question, "That's the reason that you left 
the job?" 
Answer, "Yes." 
Were those the questions and answers that 
were put to you on that date? 
A Yes. 
Q And, in fact, that was contemplated, as we've 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
er r\ A 
JL O JL 
stated, that you were not going to be paid beyond the 
date the construction was complete; correct? 
A Yes. 
Q But that was your reason for leaving the job. 
So I want you to explain that to me. 
A Why I left? 
Q Why was the failure to pay supervisory fees 
beyond that week justification for you leaving the 
job? 
A Well, on November the 3rd in their office we 
had this small punch list of items from the inspector, 
and it was obvious to me that — I had already 
contacted the electrician, made copies, highlighted 
things to be completed. 
And I told the Reeves that night, I said, 
"Well, it's obvious that there's not much for me to 
do. How much longer do you want me to stay on this 
job?" 
And they said, "Friday is the last day that 
we want you here." 
And that's why I didn't return after Friday. 
Q But Friday was the day they intended to go 
through the final inspection process with you; isn't 
that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
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MR. LAMBERT: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: All right, then. Attorneys1 fees 
may be submitted by affidavit based upon the 
stipulation here in open court. 
MR. LAMBERT: Let me make sure if we've 
received all my exhibits. 
(Discussion held off the record.) 
MR. LAMBERT: Actually, I want to call 
Mr. Steinfeldt on my case in chief briefly. 
THE COURT: All right. If you'll come 
forward, please, raise your right hand, the clerk will 
administer the oath. 
THAD BRENT STEINFELDT 
called as a witness herein, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Have a seat in the witness chair, 
please. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LAMBERT: 
Q Mr. Steinfeldt, will you please state your 
full name. 
A Thad Brent Steinfeldt. 
Q Where do you reside? 
A 143 South 800 East, Spanish Fork, Utah. 
Q And are you a licensed general contractor in 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
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1 Q When you filed your lien on November the 5th, 
2 you had never sent a billing to the Reeves for the 
3 last work you had done, had you? 
4 A I mailed that bill on that day since that was 
5 the last day that they wanted me on the job. I could 
6 not bill them prior to that time because I actually 
7 wasn't sure when they wanted me to finish my 
8 responsibilities as general contractor. And so I 
9 submitted the bill on the 5th, which was Friday. 
10 Q But you knew the Reeves intended to move in 
11 over the weekend, didn't you? 
12 A That was their plan, yes. 
13 Q And they advised you of that? 
14 A Yeah, I knew they were going to do that. 
15 Q And did you discuss with them on Wednesday 
16 after the inspection had been made that they wanted 
17 the inspector to come back for the final inspection on 
18 Friday so they could move in over the weekend? 
19 A That was our intention, yes. 
20 Q But you did not schedule that inspection on 
21 Friday, did you? 
22 A No, I did not schedule that on Friday. I'll 
23 tell you why if you want to know. 
24 Q Well, what I'm saying is that when you filed 
25 your lien on Friday the 5th, you had never submitted a 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
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witness . 
MR. JEFFS: At this time, your Honor, we 
would like to call Thad Steinfeldt. 
THE COURT: If you'd come forward, sir, and 
take the witness chair, I remind you you are still 
under oath. 
THAD BRENT STEINFELDT 
recalled .as a witness herein, having previously 
been sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEFFS: 
Q You've already stated your name for the 
record, but could you tell us how long you've been in 
the construction business? 
A My grand dad was a building contractor, so my 
whole life, I guess. 
Q Just about as long as you can remember? 
A Pretty much. 
Q From August 9th to November 3rd did you 
continue to act as the general contractor for the 
Reeves? 
A Yes. 
Q And what work did you perform during that 
time? 
A Scheduled the subcontractors, coordinated 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
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Q And they had stated that they were not paying 
these subs the additional amount? 
A I told them that they didn't have many of the 
final invoices and that some of these would be higher 
than what was the original estimate. And Shawn said, 
"Well, all we're paying is what they told us that they 
would charge us for." 
Q So you filed a lien on November 4th; correct? 
A The 5th. 
Q Excuse me. Thank you. For approximately 
$17,900? 
A Yes. 
Q And how did you come up with that figure? 
A I knew how much we had drawn on the home up 
to that point. And I knew in my mind what — I went 
down each of the categories on our estimate sheet, and 
I estimated because the Reeves wouldn't tell -- I 
asked them. 
I said, "I would like to see the invoices." 
And they said, "No, we're not going to show 
them to you." 
So I had to estimate what the total would be 
on each of those invoices, and that's how I arrived at 
that number, four percent of that cost. 
Q And then you did a four percent cost? 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
(Exhibit 29 received into evidence.) 
Q (BY MR. JEFFS) Were all of the expenses 
that you have just testified to necessary and 
reasonable in the construction of the Reeves home? 
A Yes. 
Q When did you learn that your request for 
payment of four percent on the cost of the house was 
in error? 
A Last week or the week before. 
Q So up until that time you felt that you were 
entitled to four percent of the cost? 
A Yes. 
Q Why did you file your lien on November 5th? 
A Say that again. 
Q Why did you file your lien on November 5th? 
A To protect my financial interest in the work 
that I had done. 
Q Because you had felt nervous --
A I was nervous. 
Q -- about getting paid? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you intend to create any problems or 
financial problems for the Reeves by filing your lien? 
MR. LAMBERT: Objection. Leading. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. It 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
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1 is leading. 
2 Q (BY MR. JEFFS) Do you know if the Reeves 
3 had a bond on the project? 
4 A I don't know of one. 
5 Q Did they request one from you? 
6 A No. 
7 Q What was your intention in signing the 
8 August 9th .agreement? 
9 A I knew after they had faxed me -- Shawn faxed 
10 me a letter saying he wanted a breakdown of all the 
11 framing costs. I went through all my expenses and 
12 realized that I had billed them for $4,000 above and 
13 beyond any costs that I had incurred. And when we 
14 signed that agreement, in my mind it was to insure 
15 that I did not try to collect the full amount of the 
16 original estimate. 
17 MR. LAMBERT: Your Honor, I object. I don't 
18 think that's responsive to the question, and I ask 
19 that it be stricken. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I'll permit it as being his 
21 explanation of why he signed it. 
22 Q (BY MR. JEFFS) You heard Mr. Lambert in his 
23 opening statement state that the August 9th 
24 agreement — by signing the August 9th agreement and 
25 agreeing to receive payment at the closing, that you 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
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Addendum 12 
D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
J:\ddl\recves.ans 
Our File No. 22,330 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. 
REEVES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT AND 
COUNTERCLAIMANT'S FIRST SET 
OF INTERROGATORIES TO 
PLAINTIFFS AND COUNTERCLAIM 
DEFENDANTS 
Case No. 940400014 
Hon. Ray M. Harding 
Plaintiffs submit the following answers to Defendant and Counterclaimant's First Set 
of Interrogatories to Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Did you enter into a contract whereby defendant was to 
construct a building for plaintiffs? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
building? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: What was the contract price for constructingjtas 
SFi&CEWED 
MAY 1 6 1994 
ANSWER: Originally 4% of selected items that plaintiffs had not taken care of 
themselves. Defendant wrongfully drew almost $14,000.00 from plaintiffs' construction loan 
under the framing labor category beyond that authorized. Plaintiffs confrorfted defendant about 
the overdraft or theft and defendant confessed that the monies were wrongfully taken. On that 
basis, a new contract was signed by both parties for a flat $10,000.00 fee and the agreement to 
pay a percentage of construction costs was voided. A copy of th efinal agreement has been 
provided. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: What was the contract price to be paid to defendant for 
constructing the building? 
ANSWER: See answer to interrogatory no. 2. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Was any provision made for any extra work or changes 
that were to be made? 
ANSWER: Not originally. The final written agreement allowed $20/hour for 
changes approved in advance. Previously plaintiffs paid all actual labor and materials involved 
in changes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: If so, what provision was made for extra work or 
changes? 
ANSWER: See answer to interrogatory no. 4. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: On what date was the defendant to begin construction 
on the building? 
2 
ANSWER: Approximately April 1, 1993. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Did you furnish the defendant with detailed plans and 
specifications for constructing this building? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: If so, on what date did you furnish the plans? 
ANSWER: February, 1993. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: What is the name, or other means of identification, and 
address of the architect who prepared these plans? 
ANSWER: Larry Schaugaard, Pleasant Grove, Utah. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Did you at any time inspect the progress of the 
construction? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: If so, please state: 
a. The date and time of each inspection; and 
b. What you inspected on each occasion. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs inspected the property daily to assess progress. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Did any one [sic] else inspect the progress of the 
construction? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: If so, please state: 
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a. The name, or other means of identification, and address of each person 
who made an inspection; 
b. The profession or other qualification of each person who made an 
inspection; 
c. The date and time of each inspection; and 
d. What was inspected on each occasion. 
ANSWER: 
a and b. Arlan Ostergaard, General Contractor; Carl Baldwin, General 
Contractor; Kim Anderson, General Contractor, and LIndon City building inspectors. 
c and d. Mr. Ostergaard inspected uneven door heights in early July, 
1993. Exact items inspescted and dates of inspection by the other contractors are presently 
unknown to plaintiffs 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Did you find any defects in the work during any 
inspection while construction was in progress? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: If so, please state: 
a. The date of each inspection when the defects were found; 
b. The name, or other means of identification, of the person who found 
each defect; 
c. What was defective; and 
d. The facts on which you rely in contending the defect existed. 
ANSWER: Door heights and items specified by the building inspector. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 16: Were any defects brought to the attention of the 
defendant, or was he asked to correct any defects? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 17: If so, please state: 
a. The name, or other means of identification, of each person who 
requested that any defect be corrected; 
b. What the defendant was requested to correct; 
c. The date that the defendant was requested to make each correction; 
d. What was said to the defendant; 
e. Whether the defendant agreed to make each correction; and 
f. What the defendant said in his reply. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs brought to the attention of Mr. Steinfeldt the fact that 
numerous door heights were wrong and requested him to measure them again and fix the 
problem. They were told by Mr. Steinfeldt that he would take care of it. The other defects 
were noted after defendant left the job. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Did the defendant make any correction of any alleged 
defects? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: If so, please state: 
a. The date that each correction was made; 
b. What was corrected on each day; and 
c. How each alleged defect was corrected. 
ANSWER: In approximately August, 1993 the door heights were changed but they 
were still the wrong height. Plaintiffs paid for the labor to do this. Finally, Kim Anderson, a 
finish contractor, and crew came in and fixed each door. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Did the defendant refuse to make any correction of any 
alleged defect? 
ANSWER: On the second request, he refused. Plaintiffs then called in Kim 
Anderson to finish the job. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: If so, please state: 
a. The date that the defendant refused to correct any defect; 
b. Which defect was refused to correct on each date; 
c. The reason defendant gave for refusing each defect; and 
d. What the defendant said when he refused to correct each defect. 
ANSWER: In approximately September, 1993 they asked defendant to correct the 
door height problem and he refused. He gave no reason for not wanting to do it. He said Kim 
Anderson could do it. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Did the defendant complete the construction of the 
building? 
ANSWER: No. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 23; If the defendant did not complete the construction of 
the building, was construction finally completed? 
ANSWER: Yes, all but some finish work for which plaintiffs are waiting materials. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: If so, please state: 
a. The name, or other means of identification, and address of each person 
who supervised this construction; 
b. The date that this person started supervision; 
c. The date that construction was completed; and 
d. The cost to complete construction. 
ANSWER: 
a. Plaintiffs; Arlan Ostergaard, General Contractor; Kim Anderson, 
General Contractor; and Mark Larson. 
b. In approximately November, 1993. 
c. The construction was completed on approximately January 15, 1994. 
d. The cost of completion was approximately $3,000.00. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25: Did you order the defendant to quit construction of the 
building? 
ANSWER: No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: If so, please state: 
a. The date that he was ordered to quit; and 
b. The reason he was ordered to quit. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27: Did you request any changes in the original plans while 
construction was under way? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 28: If so, please state: 
a. The date each change was requested; and 
b. What changes were requested. 
ANSWER: In approximately September, 1993, they made a change in the small 
2-foot wall by the refrigerator at defendant's suggestion. Defendant made it uneven so the 
cabinetmaker had to make uneven trim. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 29: Did the defendant agree to -make these changes? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 30: If so, please state: 
a. When did defendant agree to make the changes; 
b. The name, or other form of identification, and address of each person 
present when he agreed to make any requested changes; and 
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c. The change defendant agreed to make. 
ANSWER: Defendant agreed to the changes on the same day they were requested 
by the plaintiffs at his suggestion. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 31: Did you agree to pay any additional compensation for 
making these changes? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 32: If so, please state: 
a. The date when you agreed to pay the additional amount; 
b. The amount of extra compensation that you agreed to pay for the 
changes; and 
c. The name, or other means of identification, and address of each person 
present when you agreed to pay the extra compensation. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs agreed to pay the additional amount on the same day they 
made the request for changes. Materials and framing hours at $20/hour. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 33: Did you pay the defendant any portion of the contract 
price for the construction of the building? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 34: If so, please state: 
a. The date on which you made each payment; 
b. The amount of each payment; and 
c. The stage of completion of the building when you made each payment. 
ANSWER: See draw sheet. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 35: Did you pay the defendant anything for extra work that 
he did? 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs object to this interrogatory on the basis the phrase Mextra 
work" is vague and ambiguous. Plaintiffs paid all monies due defendant up to the time 
defendant abandoned the job. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 36: If so, please state: 
a. For what extra work he was paid; 
b. The amount that he was paid; and 
c. The date that he was paid. 
ANSWER: See objection above and answer to no. 37 below. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 37: Did you pay the defendant the full amount that was due 
him on the contract for extra work and for other incidentals? 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs paid all sums as they came due; however, defendant did not 
bill plaintiffs for the last monies due at closing and instead, liened the property. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 38: If not, please state: 
a. What amounts have not been paid; and 
b. The reason that each such amount has not been paid. 
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ANSWER: Plaintiffs were not provided invoices or verification for any "extra 
work" now claimed by defendant and plaintiffs received no advance notice of such work. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 39; What is the complete cost of the construction of the 
building? 
ANSWER: Approximately $550,000. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 40; Itemize each individual cost by sub-contractor, date of 
payment and amount paid, and what part of construction it related to. 
ANSWER: See Zion's Mortgage Co. draw sheets in possession of defendant's 
counsel. 
DATED this )2 day of May, 1994. 
HOWARD, LEWI, 
Attorneys for Plaint1 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. REEVES, being first duly sworn, depose and state 
that they are the plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, that the have read the foregoing Answers 
to Interrogatories and that the same are true and accurate to the best of their own personal 
knowledge, information and belief. 
SHAWN F. REEVES 
JULJEJ*. REEVES 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this of May, 1994 
A>Ut AN.*. -
/••EiftSSaftA 't 20 East 
i ®*vEcPJr/ y*y Commission 6: *p.T\ir. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this 1 ^-> day of May, 1994. 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
TARY 
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LINDON CITY 
383 WEST LAKEVIEW ROAD 
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TELEPHONE (801) 785-5043 
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INSPECTION REPORT 
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• Reinspection fee 
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LINDON CITY 
383 WEST LAKEVIEW ROAD 
LINDON, UTAH 84042 
TELEPHONE (801) 785-5043 
BUILDING COMPLIANCE 
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the job? 
A No, he did not. There were no draws 
submitted. 
MR. LAMBERT: Those are all the questions I 
have of this witness. 
MR. JEFFS: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. You may step down. 
MR. LAMBERT: Your Honor, at this time I'll 
call Mr. Reeves. 
THE COURT: All right. If you111 come 
forward, please, raise your right hand, the clerk will 
administer the oath to you. 
SHAWN F. REEVES 
called as a witness herein, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Be seated in the witness chair, 
please. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LAMBERT: 
Q Mr. Reeves, will you please state your full 
name. 
A Shawn Farrell Reeves. 
Q And where do you reside? 
A 53 West 650 North in Lindon, Utah. 
Q And you are married to Julie Reeves who just 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
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the cost of completing the work he had not performed? 
A Yes, I did. 
MR. LAMBERT: Those are all the questions I 
have. 
THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEFFS: 
Q When was your construction loan going to 
expire? 
A The short-term? 
Q Uh-huh. 
A November 12th. 
Q November 12th. Did you tell -- in the 
meeting of November 3rd did you tell Mr. Steinfeldt 
that you wanted the house to be completed by 
November 5th? 
A That's when Thad said it would be scheduled. 
We would have final inspection on Friday. He would 
take care of that. 
Q And when did you receive your temporary 
occupancy? 
A That Friday afternoon at 4:15 when the 
building inspector came by. He said, "You guys have 
taken care of all the safety problems. Here go ahead 
and start moving your luggage and your clothes. 
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You're welcome to do so." 
Q So that was at 4:15? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q So you moved in when? 
A We started moving stuff over on Saturday. 
Q This is Exhibit 14 which is the Lindon City 
Building Inspection Report. And on the first page 
there's a long list that your wife and I went over. 
When was the first time you saw that document? 
A When we came to the house on Thursday 
morning, this list was posted. And we were told then 
by the building inspectors we had to have all the 
safety stuff done to be able to be move on Saturday, 
not to get a final, but just to move in. It would 
have been the Thursday morning before. 
Q Along the left-hand side of that document 
there's a series of marks, little tiny slash marks it 
looks like. 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Do you know who put those on there? 
A I don't. But by looking at the categories, I 
would say those are safety items that have to be done. 
Every one of those are safety items. 
Q And some of those are dealing with the 
electrical; correct? 
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A Yes. And that was part of the safety. Most 
of them are electrical. Fire-rated doors is listed 
also. These are the things we had to get done so we 
could get in for temporary, the things we didn't want 
to get hurt. 
Q Do you know if Mr. Steinfeldt contacted any 
of the subcontractors to take care of those items 
prior to the 5th? 
A I'd say no. To the best of my knowledge I'd 
say no because we had to call and it was news to 
everybody we had to do this and this and this. It was 
news to everybody. So I would say to the best of my 
knowledge, no, he did not. 
Q Mr. Lambert read you a long list of things 
that you claimed were not completed. And I'd like to 
go over those for just a moment with you. You stated, 
and we just talked about it, that there were some 
electrical stuff that needed to be completed. 
Do you know who is responsible to take care 
of the actual repair of those problems that were 
needed to be done? 
A Well, the ultimate responsibility would be 
the general contractor. But since he wasn't there, I 
worked with Wayne Mortensen, an electrician, and Jeff, 
his number one man, in telling what the priority items 
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were that needed to be done. 
Q Is it normally the general contractor's job 
to contact those people and have them come in and fix 
the problem? 
A Yes, but they were already there because they 
had not finished hanging all of their lights. They 
were there anyway. 
Q Did you specifically work on the electrical, 
I mean physically do some of the electrical work? 
A Yeah, minor. I mean, I put on some plates, 
metal plates, and stuff to hide things so they would 
pass, not to hide them, but to cover -- you know, put 
metal plates on the sockets and stuff. I did a little 
bit of that, but most of it I had Jeff and those guys 
do. 
Q Moving on to the painting, you said they 
showed up to your house and started taking paint out 
of your garage. That's always an interesting concept 
to me since you purchased the paint anyway. When was 
that conversation with those people in your garage? 
A That was on the 4th, on that Thursday. 
Q And what did they tell you? 
A Well, for one thing they took all their paint 
supplies. I mean, they took all their brushes and 
rollers, but not the physical paint. They took all 
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their equipment. 
I didn't mean to say the paint. But, of 
course, I did purchase the paint. But they told me at 
the time that the funds — that Thad had called the 
owner G and M and frozen the funds and put a lien on 
the house, and they would not be paid, so they were 
not going to do the touch-ups for me. 
Q Did you know if the lien had been filed at 
the time of that conversation? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Was it filed? 
A I had an employee that was placing a lien, 
one of my employees was placing a lien on one of my 
builder contractors. And he happened to be in the 
same line that Thad was. And he noticed what Thad was 
doing. He called me and notified me on my cellular 
phone that Thad was in line putting a lien on my home. 
Q This is a copy of Exhibit 2. And on that it 
shows the recording information right there. Could 
you please read the date that that was recorded. 
A It was recorded on -- I can't tell the 
number -- November -- I don't know if that's a 3 or 
a 5. But it says 2:43 p.m. 
Q Is that a 5? 
A It could be a 5 or a 3. 
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Q So, in other words, the lien had not been 
filed --
A It was not recorded. It could have been 
filed, Mark was there that afternoon, so I don't 
know. 
Q Let's move on to sheet rock. You stated that 
you had to have some sheet rock done? 
A That's correct. 
Q And Kent Brezee did that? 
A That's right. 
Q And what areas needed to be sheet rocked? 
A Well, mostly they were touch-ups and repairs. 
Like I stated before, the electricians — where all 
the plugs were wrong, had to be ripped out and resheet 
rocked around them, retextured, repainted. And Kent 
did a lot of that for us. 
And there was a lot of touch-ups too in 
certain areas that he -- like the textures -- he'd 
say, "I've got to do this over again. This isn't 
right." Like a painter, he did his job 100 percent 
like he liked it. 
Q Whose responsibility is it to make sure that 
the sheet rocking was done properly? 
A The ultimate responsibility would be the 
general contractor's. 
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Q Would it have been Thad's responsibility to 
physically do the sheet rocking? 
A Of course not. 
Q Let's talk about your refrigerator. And I 
guess you stated you had Arlan Ostergaard --
A Yes. 
Q -- hook the plumbing up for that. Whose 
responsibility is that? 
A It's the general contractor's responsibility 
to set all the appliances in the home and make sure 
they're functioning in good order. 
Q Let's go way back to March of '93 when you 
originally entered into the contract. Isn't it true 
that when you entered into the cost plus contract with 
Mr. Steinfeldt that landscaping and appliances were 
not to be included in that figure? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. Kim Anderson came in and did some 
doors, and I missed part of this one, and so you'll 
have to tell me again. What did Mr. Anderson actually 
do? 
A Kim did extensive -- actually ripped out a 
few doors. Thad's framing crew had misframed them two 
to three times at different heights. And so the 
original doors would not fit in them. So they tore 
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them out and put in new finish work and actually 
modified all the doors or the door openings so the 
doors would fit because the framing heights had been 
all off, every door was different. 
Q Which doors did he do? 
A The ones he repaired — he repaired my office 
door. He repaired the guest bedroom door, a couple of 
the bathroom doors. I think one of the kid's bedroom 
doors. And then also the door down to the basement 
had to be redone. 
Q Which door in the basement? 
A The door going down, not the one down, but 
the first one. 
Q Let's talk about rekeying the house. When 
did you have it rekeyed actually? 
A I'd have to look at the receipt, but I think 
it was on Friday the 5th is when we had it rekeyed. 
Q And do you know who arranged for that? 
A Yes. My wife called Orem Locksmith, and they 
came out on Saturday -- actually called them Friday, 
couldn't make it, said they'd be out Saturday morning. 
And he rekeyed the locks for us. 
Q Let's talk about the linoleum, and it was 
bubbling and waving. 
A It hadn't set yet. 
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Q And you had to increase the heat in the room; 
is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And then put weights on it? 
A That's correct. 
Q Do you know if when they originally laid the 
linoleum if the heat was on at the house at that time? 
A At the time they laid the linoleum they told 
us it was in the recommended temperature range, that 
it shouldn't be a problem with Mannington. 
Q Who told you that? 
A The guys at the floor covering place. And so 
they said it was an allowable temperature. They said 
it was boardor line, but they said it should work out 
fine. And if not, we'll cover it and warranty it and 
get it done right. 
Q You talked about the trim that needed to 
be -- I believe you said hung or put in place. 
A Finish work. 
Q Do you know which trim specifically that was? 
A We had trim in our timber room, we call it, 
all the way around where the sheet rock met. And we 
had just a lot of base and finish work around --
between, you know, the washer and dryer, and the 
office area, just little places, a few feet, three 
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feet, molding, a little cove that had not been put in. 
Basically, touch-up and to finish all the finish work. 
Q And whose responsibility would that normally 
have been to do the trim work, the finish carpenter? 
A Under the direction of the general 
contractor, sure. 
Q Who was the finish contractor? 
A Kim Anderson and Boyd Tibbets. 
Q So you just had to schedule them to come in 
and do that is what effectively took place? 
A Beside scheduling them and calling them, we 
had to point out all the places that weren't done and 
that we wanted done, and materials, stain, the whole 
nine yards. 
They had used up a lot of the stuff on 
redoing the doors that Thad had left wrong. And we 
had to buy more materials and things like that because 
of the mistakes in all the door heights. 
Q Let's talk about the crawl space. Now, you 
stated that you had to strap the plumbing up. 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Isn't that normally the plumber's job? 
A I don't know. It's one of the safety things 
that had to be done. Somebody had to do it. It 
wasn't done by -- I don't know. I wouldn't know whose 
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responsibility that is. 
Q You talked about the dishwasher wouldn't 
close properly. Who did you purchase the dishwasher 
from? 
A Sure Appliances. 
Q So wouldn't it have been their responsibility 
to correct that problem? 
A I don't know. I don't know the answer to 
that question. It had to be fixed. It was leaking 
all over the floor. We couldn't run another load of 
dishes without it being fixed. Kim was able to spot 
what was wrong and quickly fixed it, so it's kind of a 
moot point. 
Q Isn't it true that the appliances were not a 
part of the original contract? 
A That's right. That's right. 
Q You talked about the landscaping, that you 
had to dig a ditch --
A Yes. 
Q -- so that it wouldn't spash. Isn't it true 
that the landscaping was not a part of the original 
contract? 
A That's true. But the ditch had to be dug for 
safety reasons. That's one of the safety code reasons 
because they wouldn't let that pass and us move into 
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the house until we committed to do that because they 
were scared of the rain splahing up and rotting the 
foundation wall. 
So that was more of a safety thing than 
landscaping. It wasn't esthetic. It was actual 
functional. Any contractor should know about the 
drainage of that house and what kind of water would 
come off that and where it was going to go. 
Q Let's talk about the windows and the screens 
that you put in. Whose job is that normally to put 
those in? 
A The windows were installed by the general 
contractor. I kind of assumed that the screens go 
along with it. 
Q Did Mr. Steinfeldt tell you that if you 
wanted him to put the screens in he would charge you 
extra for that? 
A No, he did not. 
Q The doors in the garage that needed the 
little metal -- I don't know what they're called --
skins I think you called them. 
A Yes. 
Q Did you have the door company come in and put 
those in? 
A Yes, I did. I 
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Q The porch -- or that little log that 
Mr. Cohen charged you $100 to think about, that's this 
beam. I don't want to write on your picture. 
A This beam and these two pieces. 
Q Did the original plans have them placed in 
that position? 
A Yes. 
Q Or were they attached directly to the roof? 
A No, they were part of that position 
underneath to show kind of a support system 
underneath. 
Q I'm talking about the beam itself. Was the 
beam originally attached to the roof -- to be attached 
to the roof? 
A That's the way Thad thought he should do it. 
But after looking at it, he realized that wouldn't 
look good, and it would mess up with the rain gutters. 
So he said it can't be done that way. 
Q And did he tell you that it needed to be 
attached up underneath the eaves like this is there? 
A No, this other guy figured that out. Again, 
it's for the esthetics. It's not for support. 
Q You have these two invoices -- let me get the 
originals here -- when you traded out some materials. 
A Yeah. 
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leaving the job. 
A As I said, Thad did refuse to do that. He 
said, "I'm not going to mess with that thing." So 
Julie and I thought it was important to finish the 
house the way the plans were, so we found somebody 
else to do it. 
Q Do you have any knowledge of whether Thad 
contacted any of the subcontractors on the 3rd or the 
4th of November to — 
A No. 
Q Excuse me. Let me finish. -- to tell them 
they needed to come in and finish for the final 
inspection? 
A No. 
Q Between the time you claim that Thad walked 
off the job until the time you received the temporary 
occupancy permit on the afternoon of the 5th, how much 
work did you actually perform on the house? 
A I think I went through that whole list with 
my attorney on that. I went through every category. 
A lot of it was physically myself moving the trash. 
The actual physical things I did — most of it was 
running around town being an errand boy for the 
electricians, making sure they had materials. 
Julie was on the phone scheduling this, and 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
97 
we're coordinating on the cellular phone back and 
forth trying to get everything coordinated and 
everybody there at the right time. 
I know I took two to three loads out to the 
dump those two days, helped with putting the dirt on 
the side of the retaining wall, and just assisted in 
every one of those categories as we went through what 
was listed. 
Q How much time did you spend? 
A In those two days I think Julie and -- the 
both of us are claiming 48 hours which we think is a 
very conservative estimate. 
Q I believe that's for the whole five days. 
A No, that's just for a couple days. 
Q For two days? 
A The next -- the following week I took the 
whole week off from work, Monday through Friday, 
getting all the loans and all the attorney and title 
company stuff done. 
Q So what you just testified to, if I 
understood you correctly, is that in two days you and 
your wife spent --
A It would be Thursday, all day Thursday, all 
day Friday, all day Saturday, and Monday. And Tuesday 
is when we got the final inspection. So those five 
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hours. Let me tell you. 
Q Do you have any records to say what time you 
spent on what job? 
A We didn't keep time cards. If I had known 
something was going to end up in court, I would have 
kept a missionary journal. But we didn't know at the 
time. And we've tried to document all the things we 
did, as we've already gone through with my lawyer. 
Q And you testified just now that part of that 
48 hours was spent on the 6th, which was Saturday? 
A Yes. There were still things — people -- we 
still had subcontractors there on Saturday working. 
Q And you were also moving in at that time? 
A That's correct. All the guys from work came 
down and helped me move in. 
Q I missed one. You talked about that Thad did 
not clean up the job site. Did he tell you that he 
would charge you extra for cleaning up the job site? 
A He always had in the past, so I assumed it. 
Q He had always what? 
A Always charged us in the past for taking 
trips to the dump. But when I took my first load to 
the dump, they only charged me $6. And he was 
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dash down to the recorder's office to file was to 
cause problems to the Reeves. 
I've used up my time. I would just like to 
say that in terms of being the prevailing party in 
this action, both of his liens allege a contract that 
the Court has already ruled is invalid, superseded 
what we marked as Exhibit 1. 
And we are the prevailing party. We had to 
litigate through that process in order to do that. We 
feel that we had to resolve this lien with him. We 
were required to by the title company. He signed the 
indemnity agreement as well. We were required to get 
that matter resolved. 
He was never willing to consider his failures 
and to compromise the matter on that basis; and, 
therefore, my client should be considered the 
successful or prevailing party in this. And we submit 
that we are entitled to judgment. 
I have proposed findings and conclusions that 
I'll submit to the Court at this time for whatever 
assistance they may be to the Court in deliberating on 
this matter. And I'll conclude at least the main part 
of my argument on that basis. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jeffs. 
MR. JEFFS: Your Honor, we again renew our 
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never given that information. 
Also the plaintiffs could have complied with 
the statute and paid and then sued for a refund in 
order to fall within this statute, and they failed to 
do that. 
Defendant is entitled to his attorney fees in 
this matter as a result of 38-1-18 and the foreclosure 
of his lien. He is also entitled to the cost in 
interest from November 5th, 1993, until the date of 
this judgment. 
Mr. Steinfeldt was also required to file a 
motion for summary judgment when the plaintiffs filed 
under the wrong statute. The Court has reserved its 
ruling on the motion to dismiss on the issue of 
attorney's fees, and we would request that you rule on 
that also. 
The defendant was also required to file a 
motion to compel against the plaintiffs for failing to 
answer discovery requests. We would request that we 
be entitled to our attorney's fees in that matter 
also. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Lambert? 
MR. LAMBERT: Well, there's a lot of things 
I'd like to say, but I won't. But let me say this, 
the defendant wants to be paid just as though -- just 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, StaU of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Cn\lR^™ffi$f ' "cuputy 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. 
REEVES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba STEINFELDT 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 940400014 
DATE: October 17, 1994 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for ruling after a bench trial was conducted on 
October 3, 1994. Both Plaintiffs and Defendant were present and represented by counsel. 
The Court hereby rules as follows: 
Defendant is entitled to the benefit of the amended contract which he entered into with 
Plaintiffs. However, Defendant wrongfully filed a lien in excess of his rightful entitlement 
and filed the lien too soon. Under the contract Defendant was to be paid at the time of 
closing, at the time Defendant filed the lien the monies were not yet due. Therefore, while 
Defendant is entitled to the $10,000 under the contract, $300 weekly contractor's fee, and $20 
per hour for any extras, any amount due him is subject to the following: 
1. Defendant must remove the lien now on the property. 
2. Defendant shall be responsible for the payment of the reasonable and necessary 
attorney's fees which Plaintiff incurred in bringing this action. 
3. Defendant shall be required to reimburse Plaintiffs for those expenses required to 
complete the job which he was required to do under the contract. Specifically, Plaintiffs shall 
be reimbursed for the 48 houi£ they spent in supervision and cleanup, at the rate of 20 per 
hour. 
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to $403.00 in interest for the monies they were forced to 
escrow in this matter. 
5. The payment of $140.00 to Kim Anderson by Plaintiffs shall be deducted from the 
amount Defendant is due. 
ooc 
Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
Judgment within 15 days of this decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and 
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for 
signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 17th day of October, 1994. 
cc: D. David Lambert, Esq. 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
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WILLIAM M. JEFFS, #5726 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 373-8848 
Facsimile: 373-8878 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and | NOTICE OF APPEAL 
JULIE N. REEVES, 
i 
Plaintiffs, 
I 
VS. 
I 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, | 
Defendant, j 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Counter Claimant, 
vs. 
SHAWN F. REEVES and 
JULIE N. REEVES, 
X 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Civil No. 940400014 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Notice is hereby given that Thad B. Steinfeldt, dba Steinfeldt Construction, Defendant 
and Counter Claimant/Appellant, by and through counsel William M. Jeffs appeals to the Utah 
Supreme Court from the judgments and orders set forth below: 
A. Memorandum Decision of Judge Ray M. Harding dated October 17, 1994 
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Judge Ray M. 
Harding dated November 4, 1994 
C. Judgment of Judge Ray M. Harding dated November 4, 1994 
D. Memorandum Decision of Judge Ray M. Harding Denying the 
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated December 8, 
1994. ^ 
n -4f 
DATED AND SIGNED this h ( day of December, 1994. 
MA- ;W/ 
William M. Jeffs Tl 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Counter Claimant/Appellant 
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FILED IN 
4TH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
95JAN 11 M M 31 
D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), and 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our File No. 22,330 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. 
REEVES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant. 
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba 
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION, 
Counter Claimant, 
vs. 
SHAWN F. REEVES and JULIE N. 
REEVES, 
NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL 
Case No. 94040CH4 
Hon Ray M. Harding 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Notice is hereby given that Shawn F. Reeves and Julie N. Reeves, plaintiff and 
counterclaim defendants, by and through their counsel, D. David Lambert, cross appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court from the judgments and orders set forth below: 
1. Memorandum Decision of Judge Ray M. Harding, dated October 17, 1994; 
2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Judge Ray M. Harding, dated 
November 4, 1994; and 
3. Judgment of Judge Ray M. Harding, dated November 4, 1994. 
DATED this 11** day of January, 1995. 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim Defendants 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this I i day of January, 1995. 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
J:\DDL\REEVES.NTC 
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A On the 15th. 
Q And have you then attempted to calculate the 
interest differential between the amount that you had 
financed on your construction loan at the construction 
loan rate compared to the same amount at the 
long-term financing rate for those ten days that you 
were delayed in closing? 
A Yes, we have. And the one was a base plus 
two, which would be six plus two was eight. And our 
long-term was four and an eighth. The eight days of 
interest came to approximately $403. 
Q With respect to the cost of having to escrow 
the money at Security Title Company, have you 
attempted to calculate that based on Exhibit No. 20? 
A Yes, we have. This was a little more 
confusing because it's a variable rate signature loan, 
and every month the rate can change. And it goes 
anywhere from 12.9 to 13.9 to 14.6. Just taking an 
average and estimating it, it came out to about 
$1,842.20, the finance charges we've paid. 
Q Now, that's just what you paid to Security 
Pacific; correct? 
A Yes. We made $330 payments each month, the 
minimum. So some of that went to principal which made 
it even less, and the rest went to principal too and 
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A On the 15th. 
Q And have you then attempted to calculate the 
interest differential between the amount that you had 
financed on your construction loan at the construction 
loan rate compared to the same amount at the 
long-term financing rate for those ten days that you 
were delayed in closing? 
A Y Q S , we have. And the one was a base plus 
two, which would be six plus two was eight. And our 
long-term was four and an eighth. The eight days of 
interest came to approximately $403. 
Q With respect to the cost of having to escrow 
the money at Security Title Company, have you 
attempted to calculate that based on Exhibit No. 20? 
A Yes, we have. This was a little more 
confusing because it's a variable rate signature loan, 
and every month the rate can change. And it goes 
anywhere from 12.9 to 13.9 to 14.6. Just taking an 
average and estimating it, it came out to about 
$1,842.20, the finance charges we've paid. 
Q Now, that's just what you paid to Security 
Pacific; correct? 
A Yes. We made $330 payments each month, the 
minimum. So some of that went to principal which made 
it even less, and the rest went to principal too and 
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the cost of completing the work he had not performed? 
A Yes, I did. 
MR. LAMBERT: Those are all the questions I 
have. 
THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEFFS: 
Q When was your construction loan going to 
expire? 
A The short-term? 
Q Uh-huh. 
A November 12th. 
Q November 12th. Did you tell -- in the 
meeting of November 3rd did you tell Mr. Steinfeldt 
that you wanted the house to be completed by 
November 5th? 
A That's when Thad said it would be scheduled. 
We would have final inspection on Friday. He would 
take care of that. 
Q And when did you receive your temporary 
occupancy? 
A That Friday afternoon at 4:15 when the 
building inspector came by. He said, "You guys have 
taken care of all the safety problems. Here go ahead 
and start moving your luggage and your clothes. 
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What did you do with that money? 
A I paid it back to my company. 
Q Okay. 
A Since I wasn't charging any interest and I 
was out the interest, I paid it back first. 
Q If you would have paid -- strike that. If 
Thad had agreed to take the $10,000 at the closing, 
you would have still had to borrow the $10,000 from 
your company in order to pay him; is that correct? 
A That's not correct. 
Q Where would you have received the $10,000? 
A It was in the long-term financing. Our 
construction was $380,000. We had $448,000 prepared 
for us in long term, so we had that extra money to pay 
all the subs totally in full at closing. He was 
accounted for. 
Q Then shouldn't you have had $10,000 remaining 
from the long-term financing because you didn't pay 
him the $10,000; and, therefore, you should have still 
received that $10,000 somewhere? 
A Well, I see what your point is there, but 
there was some other miscellaneous bills and stuff 
that came in too. Kim Brezee wanted to be paid now 
instead of waiting for the long-term. And so there 
had to be some things that were from left hand to 
Vonda Bassett, RPR, (801) 429-1080 
• »> i \ . AOA 
AdHp 1 
52 
the job? 
A No, he did not. There were no draws 
submitted. 
MR. LAMBERT: Those are all the questions I 
have of this fitness. 
MR. JEFFS: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. You may step down. 
MR. LAMBERT: Your Honor, at this time I'll 
call Mr. Reeves. 
THE COURT: All right. If you'll come 
forward, please, raise your right hand, the clerk will 
administer the oath to you. 
SHAWN F. REEVES 
called as a witness herein, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Be seated in the witness chair, 
please. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LAMBERT: 
Q Mr. Reeves, will you please state your full 
name. 
A Shawn Farrell Reeves. 
Q And where do you reside? 
A 53 West 650 North in Lindon, Utah. 
Q And you are married to Julie Reeves who just 
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the cost of completing the work he had not performed? 
A Yes, I did. 
MR. LAMBERT: Those are all the questions I 
have. 
THE COURT: You may cro^s-examine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEFFS: 
Q When was your construction loan going to 
expire? 
A The short-term? 
Q Uh-huh. 
A November 12th. 
Q November 12th. Did you tell -- in the 
meeting of November 3rd did you tell Mr. Steinfeldt 
that you wanted the house to be completed by 
November 5th? 
A That's when Thad said it would be scheduled. 
We would have final inspection on Friday. He would 
take care of that. 
Q And when did you receive your temporary 
occupancy? 
A That Friday afternoon at 4:15 when the 
building inspector came by. He said, "You guys have 
taken care of all the safety problems. Here go ahead 
and start moving your luggage and your clothes. 
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What did you do with that money? 
A I paid it back to my company. 
Q Okay. 
A Since I wasn't charging any interest and I 
was out the interest, I paid it back first. 
Q If you would have paid -- strike that. If 
Thad had agreed to take the $10,000 at' the closing, 
you would have still had to borrow the $10,000 from 
your company in order to pay him; is that correct? 
A Thatfs not correct. 
Q Where would you have received the $10,000? 
A It was in the long-term financing. Our 
construction was $380,000. We had $448,000 prepared 
for us in long term, so we had that extra money to pay 
all the subs totally in full at closing. He was 
accounted for. 
Q Then shouldn't you have had $10,000 remaining 
from the long-term financing because you didn't pay 
him the $10,000; and, therefore, you should have still 
received that $10,000 somewhere? 
A Well, I see what your point is there, but 
there was some other miscellaneous bills and stuff 
that came in too. Kim Brezee wanted to be paid now 
instead of waiting for the long-term. And so there 
had to be some things that were from left hand to 
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right hand. 
And Julie and I were virtually paying out of 
pocket -- had prepaid some subs out of our own funds, 
and we were going to be reimbursed on the long-term 
financing. So some of the moneys might have gone to 
reimburse Julie and I for money we had previously paid 
out of our own pocket. 
There were funds there for Thad to be paid 
$10,000 plus any other miscellaneous bills he wanted 
to turn in at closing. Of course, he didnft turn 
those bills into us until after he placed the lien on 
the home. 
Q Didn't he send you a copy of his bill on the 
6th? 
A That's when it was postmarked. 
Q Had you paid Thad the $20 per hour prior to 
October 9th when would he have submitted the bill to 
you? 
A For what? 
Q For any extra work. 
A There wasn't any extra work. 
Q How much did you tell Thad he would be paid 
at the closing? 
A Per our contract $10,000 at closing, you 
know, when the house was closed and he finished it. 
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Addendum 22 
CREDITOR (Name Address) 
SECURITY PAC EXEC/PROF SRVCS 
14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100 
AURORA.CO 80011 
PHONEt 800-274-6711 
PLEASE RETURN TOP PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT 
3861 
ACCOUNT NUMBER AVAILABLE CREDIT PAST OOE AMOUNT 
17060770 
PREVIOUS BALANCE • 
$0 .00 
- PAYMENTS 
$16,500 $0 
CASH ADVANCES * INSURANCE CHARGES • 
$ 1 6 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 
- CREDITS 
$0 .00 
- NEW BALANCE 
1 2 / 0 3 / 9 3 01 /03 /94 
OTHER CHARGES • FINANCE CHARGE 
$0.00 $114.67 
MINIMUM PAYMENT 
(f*CLUOES PAST DUE AMOUNT) 
$0.00 
$0 00 $0.00 $16,614.67 $^30.00 
TRANSACTION PESCWTtON 
11/16/93 CASH ADVANCE - CHECK 206 $16,500.00 
THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT, 
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THIS STATEMENT 
YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY. 
MONTHLY XANNUAl* RANGE 
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX OF 
RATE XRATEX BALANCES 
1.158K 13.90X ALL 
FINANCE CHARGE 
COMPUTED ON 
THIS BALANCE 
$9,900.00 
SEE EXPLANATION 
ON REVERSE SIDE 
OF THIS FORM 
AA 
THERE IS NO OATE BY WHICH. OR PERIOO WITHIN WHICH. PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES 
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
PLEASE RETURN TOP PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT 
CREDITOR (Name Address) 
SECURITY PAC EXEC/PROF SRVCS 3861 
14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100 
AURORA,CO 80011 
PHONE. 800-274-6711 
BILLING DATE ACCOUNT NUMBER CREDIT LIMIT AVAILABLE CREDIT 
1 7 0 6 0 7 7 0 $ 1 6 , 5 0 0 
PREVIOUS BALANCE 
$ 1 6 , 6 1 4 . 6 7 
_CASH ADVANCES 
$0 .00 
$0 
^WSURANCE CHARGES 
$0 .00 
• NEW BALANCE 
$16 ,792 .04 
0 1 / 0 3 / 9 4 
OTHER CHARGES 
$0 .00 
OUE_OATE 
0 2 / 0 3 / 9 4 
FINANCE CHARGE 
$ 1 7 7 . 3 7 
PAST DUE AMOUNT 
$330.00 
MINIMUM PAYMENT 
(INCLUDES PAST QUE AMOUNT) 
$660.00 
TRANSACTION DESCRIPTION 
THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT 
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THIS STATEMENT 
YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY. 
MONTHLY XANNUAL* RANGE 
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX OF 
RATE XRATEX BALANCES 
1.075* 12.90* ALL 
FINANCE CHARGE 
COMPUTED ON 
THIS BALANCE 
$16,500.00 
SEE EXPLANATION 
ON REVERSE SIDE 
OF THIS FORM 
AA 
THERE IS NO DATE BY WHICH OR PERIOD WITHIN WHICH PAYMENT MAY BE MAOE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES 
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIOE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
m/vf c £.nu « v c D I E I U U 
AURORA,CO 80011 
PHONE. 800 -274 -6711 
ACCOUNT NUMBER CRECXT LIM T AVAILABLE CREDIT 
17060770 
PREVIOUS BALANCE • 
$15 819 59 
PAYMENTS 
$660 00 
$16,500 
CASH ADVANCES 
$0 00 
CREDITS 
$0 00 
$1,165 
INSURANCE CHARGES • 
$0 00 
- NEW BALANCE 
BILLING DATE 
06/03/94 
OTHER CHARGES 
$0 00 
DUE DATE 
07/03/94 
FINANCE CHARGE 
$174 92 
PAST DUE AMOUNT 
$0 00 
MINIMUM PAYMENT 
(INCIUOES PAST DUE AMOUNT) 
$15,334 51 
TRANSACTION DESCRIPTION 
05/04/94 
05/25/94 
PAYMENT - THANK YOU 
PAYMENT - THANK YOU 
y ^ $330 00-
$330 00-
YOUR PRIVATE RESERVE CREDIT LINE IS THE^PERFECT CHOICE 
WHENEVER YOU NEED EXTRA CASH THERE ARE NEVER ANY HIDDEN 
FEES. AND YOU'LL ENJOY A LOW INTEREST RATE AND LOW MONTHLY 
PAYMENTS YOU HAVE $200 00 AVAILABLE, SO USE YOUR LINE 
OR CALL US FOR A CASH ADVANCE TODAY 
THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT 
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THIS STATEMENT 
YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY 
MONTHLY XANNUAL* RANGE 
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX OF 
RATE XRATEX BALANCES 
1 138X 13 65X ALL 
FINANCE CHARGE 
COMPUTED ON 
THIS BALANCE 
$15,377 41 
SEE EXPLANATION 
ON REVERSE SIDE 
OF THIS FORM 
THERE IS NO OATE BY WHICH OR PERIOO WITHIN WHICH PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES 
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
002A&4R 
PLEASE RETURN TOP PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT 
CREDITOR (Name Address) 
SECURITY PAC EXEC/PROF SRVCS 3861 
14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100 
AURORA,CO 80011 
PHONE 800-274-6711 
ACCOUNT NUMBER CREDIT LIMIT AVAILABLE CREDIT BILLING OATE PAST DUE AMOUNT 
17060770 $18,000 $3,114 09/03/94 10/03/94 $0 00 
PREVIOUS BALANCE CASH AOVANCES • INSURANCE CHARGES • OTHER CHARGES FINANCE CHARGE 
$15,034 39 $0 00 $0 00 $180 80 
- NEW BALANCE 
MINIMUM PAYMENT 
(INCLUOESPAST DUE AMOUNT) 
$0 00 $14,885 19 $330 00 
TRANSACTION DESCRIPTION 
08/26/94 PAYMENT - THANK YOU $330 00-
BEGINNING NOVEMBER 14, 1994, THE REPAYMENT TERMS FOR YOUR 
ACCOUNT WILL BE CHANGED YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENT WILL REDUCE AS 
YOUR BALANCE DECLINES YOU HAVE THE OPTION OF MAKING PAYMENTS 
BASED UPON THIS METHOD OR YOU CAN PAY MORE THAN THE SCHEDULED 
AMOUNT - THERE IS NO PREPAYMENT PENALTY ON YOUR ACCOUNT 
THERE IS A MINIMUM PAYMENT AMOUNT OF $70 00 IF YOU HAVE ANY 
QUESTIONS, PLEASE CALL 1-800-274-6711 AND OUR CUSTOMER SERVICE 
REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE HAPPY TO ASSIST YOU 
THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT 
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THIS STATEMENT 
YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY 
MONTHLY XANNUALX RANGE 
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX OF 
RATE XRATEX BALANCES 
1 221/ 14 65/ ALL 
FINANCE CHARGE 
COMPUTED ON 
THIS BALANCE 
$14,809 43 
SEE EXPLANATION 
ON REVERSE SIDE 
OF THIS FORM 
AA 
THERE IS NO DATE BY WHICH OR PERIOO WITHIN WHICH PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOIO ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES 
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
7002 B93R 
14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100 
AURORA,CO 80011 
PHONEi 800-274-6711 
ACCOUNT NUMBER AVAILABLE CREDIT PAST DUE AMOUNT 
17060770 $16,500 $16,500 11/03/93 12/03/93 $0.00 
PREVIOUS BALANCE CASH ADVANCES • INSURANCE CHARGES • OTHER CHARGES FINANCE CHARGE 
$0 .00 $0 .00 
NEW BALANCE MINIMUM PAYMENT (INCLUDESPAST QUE AMOUNT) 
$0 .00 
THANSACTION DESCRIPTION 
MAKE HOLIDAY SHOPPING EASY WITH YOUR PRIVATE RESERVE CREDIT 
LINE. YOUR EXCELLENT PAYMENT RECORD MEANS YOU HAVE 
$16,500.00 AVAILABLE FOR ALL YOUR HOLIDAY PURCHASES — A N D 
YOU'LL ENJOY A LOW INTEREST RATE AND LOW MONTHLY PAYMENTS. 
JUST WRITE A CHECK FROM YOUR ACCOUNT CHECKBOOK. 
THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT 
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THIS STATEMENT 
YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY. 
MONTHLY XANNUAL* 
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX 
RATE XRATEX 
1.158* 13.90* 
RANGE 
OF 
BALANCES 
ALL 
FINANCE CHARGE 
COMPUTED ON 
THIS BALANCE 
$0.00 
SEE EXPLANATION 
ON REVERSE SIDE 
OF THIS FORM 
AA 
THERE IS NO DATE BY WHICH. OR PERIOD WITHIN WHICH, PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES 
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
(2 893 
PLEASE RETURN TOP PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT 
CREDITOR (Name Address) 
SECURITY PAC EXEC/PROF SRVCS 3861 
14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100 ' 
AURORA,CO 80011 
PHONE. 800-274-6711 
ACCOUNT NUMBER CREDIT LIMIT AVAILABLE CREDIT 8ILLINO OATE PAST DUE AMOUNT 
17060770 $16,500 $518 03/03/94 04/03/94 
PREVIOUS BALANCE CASH ADVANCES • INSURANCE, CHARGES * OTHER CHARGES • FINANCE CHARGE 
^16,308.22 $0 .00 $0 .00 $0 .00 $172 .92 
> NEW BALANCE MINIMUM PAYMENT (INCLUOES PAST DUE AMOUNT) 
$500.00 $0.00 $15,981.14 $330.00 
TRANSACTION DESCRIPTION 
02/28/94 PAYMENT - THANK YOU $500.00-
YES, THERE IS AN EASY WAY TO PAY TAXES — JUST USE YOUR 
PRIVATE RESERVE CREDIT LINE CHECKBOOK. YOU HAVE THE AMOUNT 
LISTED ABOVE AVAILABLE ~ AND THE LOW INTEREST RATE AND LOW 
MONTHLY PAYMENTS MAKE PRIVATE RESERVE A GREAT WAY TO BEAT THE 
TAX-TIME BLUES. USE YOUR LINE TODAY. 
^ 
4 if 
THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT 
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THIS STATEMENT 
YOUR PERIODIC RATECS) MAY VARY. 
MONTHLY XANNUALX RANGE 
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX OF 
RATE XRATEX BALANCES 
1.075X 12.90* ALL 
FINANCE CHARGE 
COMPUTED ON 
THIS BALANCE 
$16,085.78 
SEE EXPLANATION 
ON REVERSE SIDE 
OF THIS FORM 
AA 
THERE IS NO DATE BY WHICH. OR PERIOO WITHIN WHICH. PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES 
NOTICE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
PHONE: 800 -274 -6711 
ACCOUNT NUMBER 
17060770 
PREVIOUS BALANCE • 
CREDIT LIMIT 
$16,500 
CASH ADVANCES 
AVAILABLE CREDIT 
$680 
. INSURANCE CHARGES * 
BILLING D»TE 
05/03/94 
OTHER CHARGES 
DUE DATE P 
06/03/94 
• FINANCE CHARGE 
AST DUE A 
$33i 
§15 ,649 .94 $0.00 
NEW BALANCE 
MINIMUM PAYMENT 
(INCLUOES PAST DUE AMOUNT) 
$0.00 $15,819.59 $660.00 
TRANSACTION OeSCWPTON 
RELAX — YOU HAVE $100.00 AVAILABLE TO YOU RIGHT NOW. 
JUST USE YOUR PRIVATE RESERVE ACCOUNT FOR WEDDINGS, 
GRADUATIONS, VACATIONS OR ANY PERSONAL REASON. USE YOUR 
CHECKBOOK, OR CALL 1-800-274-6711 TOBAY. 
w 
THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE. IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT. 
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN O N THIS STATEMENT. 
YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY. 
MONTHLY XANNUAL* RANGE 
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX OF 
RATE XRATEX B/ ANCES 
1.096% 13.155J ALL 
FINANCE CHARGE 
COMPUTED ON 
THIS BALANCE 
$15,481.14 
SEE EXPLANATION 
ON REVERSE SIDE 
OF THIS FORM 
THERE IS NO DATE BY WHICH. OR PERIOO WITHIN WHICH. PAYMENT MAY BE 
NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION. 
MADE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES. 
CREDITOR (Name. Address) 
PLEASE RETURN TOP PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT 
SECURITY PAC EXEC/PROF SRVCS 
14707 E 2ND AVE STE 100 
AURORA,CO 80011 
PHONE. 800-274-6711 
3861 
DUE OATE ACCOUNT NUMBER CREDIT LIMIT AVAILABLE CREDIT PAST DUE AMOUNT 
17060770 $18,000 $2,965 08/03/94 09/03/94 $0.00 
PREVIOUS BALANCE CASH AOVANCES • INSURANCE CHARGES • OTHER CHARGES • FINANCE CHARGE 
$15,182.41 $0 .00 $0 .00 $0 .00 $181.98 
. NEW BALANCE MINIMUM PAYMENT (INCLUDES PAST DUE AMOUNT) 
$330.00 $0 .00 $15 ,034 .39 $330.00 
OATE TRANSACTION DESCRIPTION 
07/15/94 PAYMENT - THANK YOU $330.00-
YOUR PRIVATE RESERVE ACCOUNT GIVES YOU A CONSISTENTLY LOW 
INTEREST RATE — WITH NO ANNUAL FEES OR CASH ADVANCE CHARGES. 
THAT MAKES YOUR ACCOUNT THE PERFECT CHOICE FOR BILL 
CONSOLIDATION OR ANY PERSONAL REASON. JUST USE YOUR CHECKBOOK 
OR CALL US AT 1-800-274-6711. 
THE BALANCE SHOWN IS NOT A PAYOFF BALANCE. IF YOU WISH TO PAYOFF YOUR ACCOUNT. 
CALL THE NUMBER SHOWN ON THIS STATEMENT. 
YOUR PERIODIC RATE(S) MAY VARY. 
MONTHLY XANNUALX RANGE FINANCE CHARGE SEE EXPLANATION 
PERIODIC XPERCENTAGEX OF COMPUTED ON ON REVERSE SIDE 
RATE XRATEX BALANCES THIS BALANCE OF THIS FORM 
1.221* 14.65* ALL $14,906.38 AA 
THERE IS NO DATE BY WHICH. OR PERIOO WITHIN WHICH. PAYMENT MAY BE MADE TO AVOIO ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES 
NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
